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1
Abstract
Softwarewatermarking is a defence technique used to prevent soft-
ware piracy by embedding a signature in the code. When an illegal
copy is made, the ownership can be claimed by extracting the signa-
ture. The signature has to be hidden inside the code and it has to be
difficult for an attacker to detect, tamper or remove it. In this paper
we show how the ability of the attacker to identify the signature can
bemodelled in the framework of abstract interpretation as a complete-
ness property. We view attackers as abstract interpreters that can pre-
cisely observe only the properties for which they are complete. In this
setting, hiding a signature in the code corresponds to insert it in terms
of a semantic property that can be retrieved only by attackers that are
complete for it. Indeed, any abstract interpreter that is not complete
for the property specifying the signature cannot detect, tamper or re-
move it.
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1 Introduction
Software developers are interested in protecting the intellectual property of
their products against software piracy, namely to prevent the illegal reuse of
their code. Code obfuscation, whose aim is to obstruct code decipherment,
represents a preventive tool against software piracy: attackers cannot steal
what theydonot understand [1]. Once an attacker goes beyond this defense,
software watermarking allows the owner of the violated code to prove the
ownership of the pirated copies [D96, 3, 2, 20]. Software watermarking is
a technique for embedding a signature, i.e., an identifier reliably represent-
ing the owner, in a cover program. This allows software developers to prove
their ownership by extracting their signature from the pirated copies. In re-
cent years researchers have developed a variety of software watermarking
techniques (e.g., [3, 2, 21]) that can be classified in three main categories
according to their extraction process: static, dynamic and abstract water-
marking. Static watermarking inserts signatures in the cover program either
as data or code and then extracts them statically, namely without execut-
ing the code [2]. Conversely, dynamic watermarking inserts signatures in the
program execution state (i.e., in its semantics) and the extraction process
requires the execution of the program, often on a special enabling input [2].
Abstract watermarking, introduced in [8], encodes the signature in such away
that it could be extracted only by a suitable abstract execution of the pro-
gram. A watermarking scheme is typically evaluated w.r.t. the following
features: credibility (how strongly it proves authorship), secrecy (how diffi-
cult it is to extract the mark), transparence (how difficult it is to realize that
a program is marked), accuracy (observational equivalence of the marked
and original program), resilience to attacks (how difficult it is to compro-
mise the correct extraction of the signature) and data-rate (amount of in-
formation that can be encoded). The quality of each existing watermarking
technique is specified in terms of there features that are typically claimed
to hold w.r.t. the peculiar embedding and extraction methods. There exists
a variety of embedding and extraction algorithms that often work on dif-
ferent object (control flow graph, variables, registers, etc.) and this makes it
difficult to compare the efficiency of different watermarking systems. It is
therefore difficult to formally prove and compare limits and potentialities
of the different watermarking systems and to decide which one is better to
use in a given scenario.
A first attempt to provide a formal definition of a watermarking system
has been proposed in [15]. Here the author introduced the idea that static,
dynamic and abstract watermarking could be seen as particular instances
of a common watermarking scheme based on program semantics and ab-
stract interpretation. In this work we start from the formal watermarking
framework proposed in [15] and we extend and validate it. The idea is to
model the embedding of the secret signature s as the encoding of s as a
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semantic property M(s) that is then inserted in the semantics of the cover
program. In this setting, the extraction process requires an analysis of the
marked code that has to be at least as precise as M(s). This notion of pre-
cision of the extraction corresponds to the notion of completeness of the
analysis in abstract interpretation. This means that in order to extract the
signature it is necessary to know how it is encoded. In this view the seman-
tic property for which the analysis has to be complete in order to extract the
signature plays the role of an extraction key. Indeed, the signature results
hidden for any observer of the program semantics that it is not complete
for M(s), namely that does not know the secret key. Based on these ideas
we provide a formal semantics-based definition of a watermarking system.
Moreover, we provide a specification of the features of a watermarking sys-
tem in the semantic framework in terms of semantic program properties.
For example, it turns out that a watermarking scheme is transparent w.r.t.
and observer when the embedding process preserves the program proper-
ties in which the observer is interested. Moreover, the resilience of a water-
marking scheme to collusive attacks, that attempt to remove the signature
by comparing different marked programs, can be modeled as a property of
abstract non-interference among programs.
Our investigation and study in this direction has led to the following
contributions.
• Specification of a formal framework based on program semantics and
abstract interpretation for the modeling of software watermarking.
The framework stabilizes the one proposed in [15].
• Formalization of the quality features (resilience, secrecy, transparence,
accuracy) used tomeasure the quality of awatermarking system in the
framework.
• Validation of the framework onfivewatermarking techniques together
with a qualitative comparison of their quality features.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic notions and mathematical notation
Given two sets S and T , we denote with ℘(S) the powerset of S, with SrT
the set-difference between S and T , with S ⊂ T strict inclusion and with
S ⊆ T inclusion. Let S⊥ be set S augmented with the undefined value ⊥, i.e.,
S⊥ = S ∪ {⊥}. 〈P,≤〉 denotes a poset P with ordering relation ≤, while
a complete lattice P , with ordering ≤, least upper bound (lub) ∨, greatest
lower bound (glb) ∧, greatest element (top) >, and least element (bottom)
⊥ is denoted by 〈P,≤,∨,∧,>,⊥〉. Often, ≤P will be used to denote the un-
derlying ordering of a poset P , and ∨P ,∧P ,>P and ⊥P denote the basic
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operations and elements of a complete lattice P . v denotes pointwise or-
dering between functions. If f : S → T and g : T → Q then g ◦ f : S → Q
denotes the composition of f and g, i.e., g ◦ f = λx.g(f(x)). f : P → Q
on posets is (Scott)-continuous when f preserves lub of countable chains in
P . f : C → D on complete lattices is additive (co-additive) when for any
Y ⊆ C, f(∨CY ) = ∨Df(Y ) (f(∧CY ) = ∧Df(Y )).
2.2 Abstract interpretation
Abstract interpretation is based on the idea that the behaviour of a pro-
gram at different levels of abstraction is an approximation of its (concrete)
semantics [6, 7]. The concrete program semantics is computed on the con-
crete domain 〈C,≤C〉, while approximation is encoded by an abstract do-
main 〈A,≤A〉. In abstract interpretation abstraction is specified as a Galois
connection (GC) (C,α, γ,A), namely as an abstraction map α : C → A and
a concretization map γ : A → C that are monotone and that form an ad-
junction: ∀y ∈ A, x ∈ C : α(x) ≤A a ⇔ x ≤C γ(y) [6, 7]. α [resp. γ] is the
left- [right] adjoint of γ [α] and it is additive [co-additive], i.e. it preserves
the lub [glb] of all the subsetes of the domain (emptyset included). Ab-
stract domains can be equivalently formalized as upper closure operators
on the concrete domain [7]. The two approaches are equivalent, modulo
isomorphic representations of the domain object. An upper closure oper-
ator, or closure, on poset 〈C,≤〉 is an operator ϕ : C → C that is mono-
tone, idempotent and extensive (i.e. ∀c ∈ C : c ≤ ϕ(c)). Closures are
uniquely determined by the set of their fixpoints ϕ(C). The set of all upper
closure operators on C is denoted by uco(C). The lattice of abstract do-
mains of C, is therefore isomorphic to uco(C) [6, 7]. Recall that if C is a
complete lattice, then 〈uco(C),v,unionsq,u, λx.>, id〉 is a complete lattice, where
id def= λx.x and for every ρ, η ∈ uco(C), ρ v η iff ∀y ∈ C : ρ(y) ≤ η(y)
iff η(C) ⊆ ρ(C). Given X ⊆ C, the least abstract domain containing X
is the least closure including X as fix-points, which is the Moore-closure
M(X) def= {∨S | S ⊆ X}. If (C,α, γ,A) is a GC then ϕ = γ ◦ α is the
closure associated with A, such that ϕ(C) is a complete lattice isomorphic
to A. Precision of an abstract interpretation is typically defined in terms
of completeness. Depending on where we compare the concrete and the
abstract computations we obtain two different notions of completeness [14,
13]. If we compare the results in the abstract domain, we obtain what is
called backward completeness (B-completeness), while, if we compare the
results in the concrete domain we obtain the so called forward complete-
ness (F-completeness). Formally, if f : C → C and ρ ∈ uco(C), then ρ is
B-complete for f if ρ ◦ f = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ, while it is F-complete for f if f ◦
ρ = ρ ◦ f ◦ ρ. A complete over-approximation means that no false alarms
are returned by the analysis, i.e., in B-completeness the approximate se-
mantics computed by manipulating abstract objects corresponds precisely
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to the abstraction of the concrete semantics, while in F-completeness the
concrete semantics does not lose precision by computing on abstract ob-
jects. The least fixpoint (lfp) of an operator F on a poset 〈P,≤〉, when it
exists, is denoted by lfp≤F , or by lfpF when ≤ is clear. Any continuous
operator F : C → C on a complete lattice C = 〈C,≤C ,∨C ,∧C ,>C ,⊥C〉
admits a lfp: lfp≤CF = ∨n∈N F i(⊥C), where for any i ∈ N and x ∈ C:
F 0(x) = x; F i+1(x) = F (F i(x)). If F ] : A→ A is a correct approximation
of F : C → C on 〈A,≤A〉, then α(lfp≤CF ) ≤A lfp≤AF ]. Convergence can be
ensured through widening iterations along increasing chains [6]. A widen-
ing operator O : P × P → P approximates the lub, i.e., ∀X,Y ∈ P : X ≤P
(XOY ) and Y ≤P (XOY ), and it is such that the increasing chainW i, where
W 0 = ⊥ andW i+1 = W iOF (W i) is not strictly increasing for≤P . The limit
of the sequence W i provides an upper fixpoint approximation of F on P ,
i.e., lfp≤PF ≤P limi→∞W i.
2.2.1 Inducing forward completeness
In [18] the authors introduced a method for inducing F-completeness. So
it is always possible to minimally transform a given semantics function f in
order to satisfy completeness. Minimally means to find the closest function,
by reducing or increasing the images of f , w.r.t. a given property we want
to hold for f (in this context, completeness). Here we take in account only
the case of increasing a given function, so we move upwards. For any f :
C
m−→ C and η, ρ ∈ uco(C) we can define
Fη,ρ
def= λf . λx .
{
ρ ◦ f(x) if x ∈ η(C)
f(x) otherwise
Wehave thatFη,ρ(f) =
d{h : C −→ C |f v h∧ h◦η = ρ◦h◦η}. The function
Fη,ρ(f) may lack monotonicity. But any function can be transformed to the
closest monotone function by considering the following basic transformer:
M def= λf . λx .
∨
C
{f(y) | y ≤C x}
So we can define the forward completeness transformer as Fη,ρ
def= M ◦ Fη,ρ,
such that
Fη,ρ(f) =
l
{h : C m−→ C | f v h ∧ h ◦ η = ρ ◦ h ◦ η}
2.3 Programming language and semantics
In this section we introduce a simple imperative programming language
which is used in the rest of the work. It is a simple extension of the one in-
troduced in [9], the main difference being the ability of programs to interact
with the user, namely the programs can deal with input values.
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Syntactic categories
• n ∈ Int . integers
• b ∈ Bool . booleans
• X ∈ Var . program variables
• L ∈ Lab . program labels
• E ∈ Exp . arithmetic expressions
• B ∈ Bexp . boolean expressions
• A ∈ Act . program actions
• C ∈ Com . commands
• P ∈ Imp def= ℘(Com) . programs
Value domains
• n ∈ Z . integer numbers
• b ∈ B def= {tt,ff} . truth values
• ρ ∈ Env def= ℘(Var) −→ ℘(Z⊥) . environments
• ι ∈ Sin def= Z? = ⋃n∈N Zn . standard inputs
• ζ ∈ Con def= Env× Sin . contexts
• ς ∈ Σ def= Com× Con . program states
Abstract syntax
• E ::= n | X | E1 op E2 where op ∈ {+, ·,−, /, . . .}
• B ::= b | E1 < E2 | E1 = E2 | B1 ∧B2 | B1 ∨B2 | ¬B
• A ::= X := E | inputX | skip
• C ::= L : A→ L′; | L : B → {Ltt, Lff}; | L : stop;
Note that the command L : stop; can be simulated by L : skip → ⊥;
and the command L : skip → L′; can be simulated by L : tt → {L′,⊥};
where⊥ is the undefined label. In the follow, with a little abuse of notation,
we refer with ⊥ every undefined value, of any type. For a given set S, we
indicate with S⊥ the set S augmented with the undefined symbol, so S⊥
def=
S ∪ {⊥}.
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Auxiliary functions
• Labels:
– labJL : A→ L′; K def= L
– labJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K def= L
– labJL : stop; K def= L
– labJP K def= {labJCK | C ∈ P}
• Variables:
– varJDK def= {X ∈ Var |X is in D} where D ∈ {E,B}
– varJX := EK def= {X} ∪ varJEK
– varJinputXK def= {X}
– varJskipK def= ∅
– varJL : A→ L′; K def= varJAK
– varJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K def= varJBK
– varJL : stop; K def= ∅
– varJP K def= ⋃C∈P varJCK
• Actions of a command:
– actJL : A→ L′; K def= A
– actJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K def= ∅
– actJL : stop; K def= ∅
• Successors of a commands:
– sucJL : A→ L′; K def= {L′}
– sucJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; K def= {Ltt, Lff}
– sucJL : stop; K def= {⊥}
– sucJP K def= ⋃C∈P sucJCK
• Environments:
– envJX K def= {ρ ∈ Env | dom(ρ) = X} where X ⊆ Var
– envJP K def= envJvarJP KK
• Contexts:
– conJρK def= {〈ρ, ι〉 ∈ Con | ι ∈ Sin} where ρ ∈ Env
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– conJP K def= {conJρK | ρ ∈ envJP K}
Furthermore we have two functions that deal with the standard inputs. The
first is top : Sin −→ Z⊥ which, given a standard input, returns the next
value that have to be passed to the program, namely
top(ι) def=
{
⊥ if ι = 
z ∈ Z if ι = zι′
The second is next : Sin −→ Sin which, given a standard input, returns
another standard input without the current value which have to be passed
to the program, namely
next(ι) def=
{
 if ι = 
ι′ ∈ Sin if ι = zι′ ∧ z ∈ Z
Semantics
Arithmetic expressions EJEK ∈ Con −→ Z⊥
• EJnKζ def= n
• EJXK〈ρ, ι〉 def= ρ(X)
• EJE1 opE2Kζ def= {EJE1Kζ op EJE2Kζ if EJE1Kζ ∈ Z and EJE2Kζ ∈ Z⊥ otherwise
Boolean expressions BJBK ∈ Con −→ B⊥
• BJttKζ def= tt
• BJffKζ def= ff
• BJE1 < E2Kζ def= {EJE1Kζ < EJE2Kζ if EJE1Kζ ∈ Z and EJE2Kζ ∈ Z⊥ otherwise
• BJE1 = E2Kζ def= {EJE1Kζ = EJE2Kζ if EJE1Kζ ∈ Z and EJE2Kζ ∈ Z⊥ otherwise
• BJ¬BKζ def= {¬ BJBKζ if BJBKζ ∈ B⊥ otherwise
• BJB1 ∧B2Kζ def= {BJB1Kζ ∧ BJB2Kζ if BJB1Kζ ∈ B and BJB2Kζ ∈ B⊥ otherwise
• BJB1 ∨B2Kζ def= {BJB1Kζ ∨ BJB2Kζ if BJB1Kζ ∈ B and BJB2Kζ ∈ B⊥ otherwise
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Actions AJAK ∈ Con −→ Con
• AJX := EK〈ρ, ι〉 def= 〈ρ[X ←[ EJEK〈ρ, ι〉], ι〉
• AJinputXK〈ρ, ι〉 def= {〈ρ[X ←[ top(ι)], next(ι)〉 if top(ι) 6= ⊥〈ρ[X ←[ ⊥], ι〉 otherwise
• AJskipKζ def= ζ
Commands CJCK ∈ Con −→ ℘(Com× Con)
• CJL : A→ L′; Kζ def= {〈C, ζ ′〉 | labJCK = L′ ∧ ζ ′ = AJAKζ}
• CJL : B → {Ltt, Lff}; Kζ def= {〈C, ζ〉 ∣∣∣∣∣ labJCK =
{
Ltt if BJBKζ = tt
Lff if BJBKζ = ff
}
• CJL : stop; Kζ def= ∅
2.3.1 Semantics of programs
The transition relation S ∈ Σ −→ ℘(Σ) specifies the successor states of a
given state:
S(〈C, ζ〉) def= {〈C ′, ζ ′〉 | ζ ′ = AJactJCKKζ ∧ labJC ′K ∈ sucJCK}
The set of states of a program is defined as:
stsJP K def= P × conJP K
The transitional semantics SJP K ∈ stsJP K −→ ℘(stsJP K) of a program P is:
SJP K〈C, ζ〉 def= {〈C ′, ζ ′〉 ∈ S(〈C, ζ〉) | ζ, ζ ′ ∈ conJP K ∧ C,C ′ ∈ P}
A trace σ ∈ Σ is a sequence of states ς0, . . . ςn−1 of length |σ| = n > 0 such
that for all i ∈ [1, n) we have ςi ∈ S(ςi−1). With Σ+ we indicate the set of
all finite traces. If σ is a finite trace, we indicate with σ` its first element, i.e.
σ` = σ0, and we indicate with σa its last element, i.e. σa = σ|σ|−1.
The partial finite traces semantics LP M⊕ ⊆ Σ+ of a program P is the least fix-
point of the so called transition function F⊕P ∈ ℘(Σ+) m−→ ℘(Σ+) defined
as:
F⊕P
def= λS . stsJP K ∪ {ςς ′σ | ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς) ∧ ς ′σ ∈ S}
So LP M⊕ = lfp⊆∅F⊕P . If we are only interested in those executions of a pro-
gram P starting from a given set LP ⊆ labJP K of entry points, so that IP def=
{〈C, ζ〉 | ζ ∈ conJP K∧C ∈ P ∧ labJCK ∈ LP } is the set of initial states, we can
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consider the partial traces semantics LP MIP⊕ ⊆ Σ+ of P which is the set of
partial traces σ ∈ Σ+ starting from an initial state ς0 ∈ IP . The partial traces
semantics LP MIP⊕ can be expressed in fixpoint form as lfp⊆∅Fι⊕P (IP ) where
Fι⊕P (IP ) ∈ ℘(Σ+) m−→ ℘(Σ+) is:
Fι⊕P (I
P ) def= λS . IP ∪ {σςς ′ | σς ∈ S ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)}
So we can define a function, called partial input semantics, LP M⊕ ∈ ℘(Σ) −→
℘(Σ+) defined as follow:
LP M⊕ def= λS . lfp⊆∅Fι⊕P (S) = λS . LP MS⊕
A state ς is blocking (or final), w.r.t. a program P , if SJP K(ς) = ∅. So the set of
blocking states of the program P is TP def= {〈C, ζ〉 ∈ stsJP K |sucJCK 6⊆ labJP K}.
A maximal finite trace of a program P , is a trace σ ∈ Σ+ of length n where
the last state σn−1 is blocking. LP Mn is the set of all the finite traces of length
n of the program P . The maximal finite traces semantics LP M+ of the program
P is given by the union of all maximal finite traces of length n > 0, namelyLP M+ def= ⋃n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn | σa ∈ TP }. This semantics can be expressed as the
least fixpoint of the transition function F+P ∈ ℘(Σ+) m−→ ℘(Σ+) defined as
follow:
F+P
def= λS . TP ∪ {ςς ′σ | ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς) ∧ ς ′σ ∈ S}
Similarly, we can define a function, called maximal input semantics, LP M+ ∈
℘(Σ) −→ ℘(Σ+) defined as follow:
LP M+ def= λS . {σ ∈ LP M+ | σ0 ∈ S}
Unfortunately, it seems that this semantic function can’t be expressed in fix-
point form in the lattice 〈℘(Σ+),⊆,∪,∩,Σ+,∅〉. A tricky way for avoiding
the problem is to calculate the function as the combination of partial input
and maximal traces semantics, so as:
LP M+ = λS . LP M⊕(S) ∩ LP M+
But a better solution would be the definition of a specific semantic domain
in which we are able to compute this function directly.
Prefix ordering Let pref : Σ+ −→ ℘(Σ+) be a function that returns set of
prefix of a given trace, so pref(σ) def= {σ′ ∈ Σ+ | ∃σ′′ ∈ Σ+ . σ = σ′σ′′}. We
can define the relation6⊆ ℘(Σ+)×℘(Σ+) which is a partial order between
sets of traces:
X 6 Y ⇔ ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ
′ ∈ Y . σ ∈ pref(σ′)∧
(∀σ′ ∈ Y ∃σ ∈ X .σ ∈ pref(σ′)⇒ Y ⊆ X)
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Reflexivity.
∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) . X 6 X holds, in fact ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ′ ∈ X .σ ∈ pref(σ′) holds for
σ′ = σ and X ⊆ X is trivially true.
Antisymmetry.
∀X,Y ∈ ℘(Σ+):
b fromX 6 Y it follows that ∀σ ∈ X ∃σ′ ∈ Y . σ ∈ pref(σ′) and so from
Y 6 X (the second part of the conjunction) it follows that X ⊆ Y
a from Y 6 X it follows that ∀σ′ ∈ Y ∃σ ∈ X .σ′ ∈ pref(σ) and so from
X 6 Y (the second part of the conjunction) it follows that Y ⊆ X
From a and b it follows that X = Y .
Transitivity.
∀X,Y, Z ∈ ℘(Σ+):
b from X 6 Y it follows that ∀σx ∈ X ∃σy ∈ Y . σx ∈ pref(σy)
a from Y 6 Z it follows that ∀σy′ ∈ Y ∃σz ∈ Z . σy′ ∈ pref(σz)
Considering a and b it’s easy to find for all σx ∈ X a σz ∈ Z such that
σx ∈ pref(σz), in fact with σy = σy′ the relation is satisfied. In the end
from Z ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X it follows that Z ⊆ X . So X 6 Z holds.
Now we have to define the elements which extend the poset 〈℘(Σ+),6〉.
The least upper bound
⊎
is defined as:⊎
X def= {σ ∈
⋃
X∈X
X | ∀σ′ ∈
⋃
X∈X
X .σ ∈ pref(σ′)⇒ σ = σ′}
Clearly, for all X ∈ X ⊆ ℘(Σ+) we have that X 6 ⊎X , namely ⊎X is an
upper bound ofX , but we have to prove that it is the least. In order to prove
that ∀X ⊆ ℘(Σ+)∀$ ∈ ℘(Σ+) . (∀X ∈ X . X 6 $) ⇒ ⊎X 6 $ we show
that its negate is false, i.e. we prove that it doesn’t exists $ ∈ ℘(Σ+) such
that (∀X ∈ X . X 6 $)⇒ ($ 6 ⊎X ∧$ 6= ⊎X ).
∀X ∈ X . X 6 $ means that ∀σ ∈ ⋃X∈X X ∃σ′ ∈ $ .σ ∈ pref(σ′) and
$ 6 ⊎X means that ∀σ′ ∈ $ ∃σ′′ ∈ ⊎X . σ′ ∈ pref(σ′′). By definition,⊎X ⊆ ⋃X∈X X so ∀σ′ ∈ $ ∃σ′′ ∈ ⋃X∈X X .σ′ ∈ pref(σ′′). But from the
last proposition and from ∀σ ∈ ⋃X∈X X ∃σ′ ∈ $ .σ ∈ pref(σ′) it follows
that$ = ⋃X∈X X (and so ⊎X ⊆ $). By the fact that ⊎X 6= $ we have that
∃σ′′ ∈ ⊎X ∀σ′ ∈ $ .σ′′ /∈ pref(σ′) which is absurd because ⊎X ⊆ $.
The bottom element is ∅ ∈ ℘(Σ+), i.e. ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) .∅ 6 X holds. In
fact, with no traces, the conditions of the relation are vacuously true and, if
X = ∅, ∅ 6 ∅ trivially holds.
Now we have all the ingredients. In fact for all X ⊆ ℘(Σ+) it’s easy to note
that
⊎X exists and it is a set of finite traces, so ⊎X ∈ ℘(Σ+). So, by the
fact that 〈℘(Σ+),6〉 has an infimum (bottom), in addition to the fact that
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for each subset of ℘(Σ+) there is a least upper bound in ℘(Σ+), we get that
〈℘(Σ+),6,unionmulti,∅〉 is a directed-complete partial order (CPO or DCPO).
Finally let’s define the maximal input semantic in this new domain. Like
for partial traces semantics, we can consider the maximal traces semanticsLP MIP+ ⊆ Σ+ of P which is the set of maximal traces σ ∈ Σ+ starting from
an initial state ς0 ∈ IP . Recall that the maximal finite traces semantics LP M+
is equal to
⋃
n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn | σa ∈ TP }, so this semantics computed starting
from states in IP is defined as LP MIP+ def= ⋃n>0{σ ∈ LP Mn |σ` ∈ IP ∧σa ∈ TP }.
In the follow we indicate with LP MnIP the set {σ ∈ LP Mn | σ` ∈ IP } and withLP Mn¯IP the set {σ ∈ LP Mn | σ` ∈ IP ∧ σa ∈ TP }, so LP MIP+ can be rewritten as⋃
n>0LP Mn¯IP . Now we can note that the following holds:⋃
n>0
LP Mn¯IP = ⊎n>0LP Mn¯IP
because for every n the traces in LP Mn¯IP are not prefixes of any trace in LP Mn¯IP ,
due to the fact that they are maximal (and so the lub returns the union of
this two sets).
So the semantics can be expressed as lfp6∅Fι
+
P (IP ) of the Scott-continuous,
and so monotone, function Fι+P (IP ) ∈ ℘(Σ+) c−→ ℘(Σ+):
Fι+P (I
P ) def= λS . LP M1IP unionmulti {σςς ′ | σς ∈ S ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)}
The first iterates of F+
P,IP
for lfp6∅F
+
P,IP
, where F+
P,IP
= Fι+P (IP ), are:
X0 = ∅
X1 = F+
P,IP
(X0) = LP M1IP unionmulti {σςς ′ | σς ∈ ∅ ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)} = IP = LP M1IP
X2 = F+
P,IP
(X1) = LP M1IP unionmulti {σςς ′ | σς ∈ X1 ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1IP unionmulti (LP M1¯IP unionmulti LP M2IP ) = LP M1¯IP unionmulti LP M2IP
X3 = F+
P,IP
(X2) = LP M1IP unionmulti {σςς ′ | σς ∈ X2 ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1IP unionmulti (LP M1¯IP unionmulti LP M2¯IP unionmulti LP M3IP ) = LP M1¯IP unionmulti LP M2¯IP unionmulti LP M3IP
By recurrence the n-th iterate of F+
P,IP
is:
Xn =
⊎n−1
i=1
LP Mi¯IP unionmulti LP MnIP
In fact
F+
P,IP
(Xn) = LP M1IP unionmulti {σςς ′ | σς ∈ Xn ∧ ς ′ ∈ SJP K(ς)} =
= LP M1IP unionmulti (⊎ni=1LP Mi¯IP unionmulti LP Mn+1IP ) =
=
⊎n
i=1
LP Mi¯IP unionmulti LP Mn+1IP = Xn+1
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Due to the fact that F+
P,IP
is Scott-continuous and that it’s defined over a
DCPO, F+
P,IP
admits a fixpoint, i.e. exists k ∈ N such that F+
P,IP
(Xk) = Xk,
and it is exactly the least upper bound of the Kleene chain of F+
P,IP
starting
from ∅. Due this considerations we get that
F+
P,IP
(Xk) =
⊎k
i=1
LP Mi¯IP unionmulti LP Mk+1IP = ⊎k−1i=1 LP Mi¯IP unionmulti LP MkIP = Xk
and so that
LP Mk¯IP ∪ LP Mk+1IP = LP MkIPLP Mk¯IP ∪ LP Mk+1IP = LP Mk¯IP ∪ {σ ∈ LP MkIP | σa /∈ TP }LP Mk+1IP = {σ ∈ LP MkIP | σa /∈ TP }
The only way to make the last equation true is to have LP Mk+1IP = ∅ and
{σ ∈ LP MkIP | σa /∈ TP } = ∅, due to the fact that {σ ∈ LP MkIP | σa /∈ TP } andLP Mk+1IP don’t share any element. So finally we have that exists k ∈ N such
that F+
P,IP
k(∅) = ⊎n>0LP Mn¯IP
Then we can define the maximal input semantics as:
LP M+ def= λS . lfp6∅Fι+P (S) = λS . LP MS+
2.3.2 Abstract semantics
If we are interested in the abstract semantics of a program, i.e. given a pro-
gram we need its abstract interpretation in a specific abstract domain, then
we can obtain a sound abstract semantics just only calculating the semantics
using the best correct approximation of the transfer function instead the trans-
fer function itself. So if a semantics is calculated in a concrete domain C as
fixpoint of the transfer functionF thenwe can calculate its abstract interpre-
tation in an abstract domain ρ ∈ uco(C) as fixpoint of the function ρFρ. If
the abstract domain is B-complete for F thenwe have that lfpρFρ = ρ(lfpF ).
For example, let 〈℘(Σ+),⊆,∪,∩,Σ+,∅〉 the concrete domain and LP M⊕ the
semantics calculated as fixpoint of the transfer function F⊕P . Then the best
correct approximation of P in ρ is:
LP Mρ⊕ def= lfp⊆∅ ρ ◦ F⊕P ◦ ρ
Let 〈℘(Σ+),6,unionmulti,∅〉 the concrete domain and LP MS+ the semantics calculated
as fixpoint of the transfer function Fι+P (S). Then the best correct approxi-
mation of P in ρ is: LP MSρ+ def= lfp6∅ ρ ◦ Fι+P (S) ◦ ρ
So the we can define the abstract maximal input semantics of P in ρ as:
LP Mρ+ def= λS . lfp6∅ ρ ◦ Fι+P (S) ◦ ρ
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2.4 Abstract non-interference
Abstract non-interference (ANI) [16] is a weakening of non-interference by
abstract interpretation. Let η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(ZL⊥)) and φ ∈ uco(℘(ZH⊥ )), where
ZL⊥ and ZH⊥ are the domains of public (L) and private (H) variables. η and ρ
characterize the attacker, instead φ states what, of the private data, can flow
to the output observation, the so called declassification of φ [19]. A program
P satisfies ANI, and we write [η]P (φ⇒ ρ), if ∀h1, h2 ∈ ZH⊥ and ∀l1, l2 ∈ ZL⊥:
η(l1) = η(l2)∧ φ(h1) = φ(h2)⇒ ρ(LP MDen(〈h1, l1〉)L) = ρ(LP MDen(〈h2, l2〉)L)
Where with LP MDen ∈ ℘(Σ) −→ Σ we denote the angelic denotational se-
mantics of the program P [17]. This notion says that, whenever the attacker
is able to observe the input property η and the ρ property of the output,
then it can observe nothing more than the property φ of private input. In
order to model non-interference in code transformations, such as software
watermarking, we consider an higher-order version of ANI, where the ob-
jects of observations are programs instead of values. Hence, we have a part
of a program (semantics) that can change and that is secret, and the envi-
ronment which remains the same up to an observable property: these are
the new private and public inputs. The function that, in some way, has to
hide the change is now a program transformer, which takes the two parts
of the program and provides a program as result. The output observation
is the best correct approximation of the resulting program.
Here the semantics we take in account is the maximal finite trace se-
mantics. Let P be the set of cover programs, Q the set of secret program
and I : Imp × Imp −→ Imp an integration function. As usual, the attacker
is modelled as a couple 〈η, ρ〉, whit η, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), that represents the
input and output public observation power. Instead φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) is the
property of the secret input.
Definition 1 (HOANIbca for maximal finite traces semantics).
The integration program I, given η, φ, ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), satisfies higher-order
abstract non-interference (for maximal finite traces semantics) w.r.t 〈η, φ, ρ〉
and 〈P,Q〉 if:
∀P1, P2 ∈ P∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q .LP1Mη+ = LP2Mη+ ∧ LQ1Mφ+ = LQ1Mφ+ ⇒ LI(P1, Q1)Mρ+ = LI(P2, Q2)Mρ+
We write H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca to indicate that the program I satisfies higher-
order abstract non-interference (for maximal finite traces semantics) w.r.t.
〈η, φ, ρ〉.
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2.4.1 Deriving attackers
In this section we introduce a method for defining attackers, via abstract
interpretation, for which a program is safe. In this case security refers to
abstract non-interference. In particular, it is interested to characterize the
most concrete (i.e. the most precise) attacker for which a program is safe.
In fact it can be shown that if it true [η]P (φ ⇒ ρ) then, for any β such that
ρ v β, it holds [η]P (φ ⇒ β) [16]. That is, if abstract non-interference holds
observing in output the property ρ, then it holds also observing in output
any more abstract properties (which distinguishes less elements) than ρ. In
[16, 19] is shown how to derive this attacker for abstract non-interference.
Following that we try to derive the attackers w.r.t. HOANIbca for maximal
finite traces semantics. In this case the sets of values are replaced by sets
of traces. The attackers are defined by pairs of abstract domains, therefore
it will be characterized a domains transformer, parametric in the program
to be analyzed, which transforms each non-secret output abstraction into
the nearest abstraction for which non-interference holds. We fix a public
input properties η and a private input property φ, with η, φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)),
and we consider an abstraction ρ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) such that it doesn’t hold
H
+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca for a program I ∈ Imp. We can derive the most concrete ρˆ
more abstract than ρ such that H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca holds, which is called higher-
order abstract secret kernel if I.
Definition 2 (Secret kernel for HOANI).
Let I ∈ Imp and KH+I,η,(φ) ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) −→ uco(℘(Σ+)):
KH+I,η,(φ)
def= λρ.
l
{β | ρ v β ∧ H+[η]I(φ⇒ β)bca}
is the higher-order abstract secret kernel trasformer for I.
To characterize this transformer we must identify how much a property is
safe. Program properties, in this case, are collections of traces so we have
to characterize the sets of traces which can be present in the kernel in or-
der to make non-interference to hold. To obtain this, we define a predicate,
on sets of traces, which identifies the elements of a given domain that form
the secret kernel. Clearly these elements must ensure non-interference, so
they must abstract in the same element all objects which must not be dis-
tinguishable. To do this we must define two equivalence relations, which
bring together the programs according to a property on public programs (η)
and a property on private programs (φ). Let ≡η,≡φ⊆ Imp× Imp such that:
≡η def= {〈P, P ′〉 | P, P ′ ∈ P ∧ LP Mη+ = LP ′Mη+}
≡φ def= {〈Q,Q′〉 |Q,Q′ ∈ Q ∧ LQMφ+ = LQ′Mφ+}
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So we can define the set of indistinguishable elements for HOANI:
ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) = {LI(P ′, Q′)M+ | P ′ ≡η P ∧Q′ ≡φ Q}
These sets are collections of sets of traces that each secure abstraction must
not distinguish, i.e. thatmust be approximated in the same object. Similarly
we can define the predicate Secr for HOANI:
∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) . SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)⇔ ∀P ∈ P∀Q ∈ Q .
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X ⇒ ∀W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ X)
So Secr(X) holds if X contains all the elements, i.e. all the sets of traces,
that have to be indistinguishable or no one of this. Indeed Secr identifies
all and only the sets which are in the secret kernel.
Theorem 1.
Let η, φ ∈ ℘(Σ+):
KH+I,η,(φ)(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}
Proof. First, it is necessary to prove that this set is an upper closure operator
and, after that, we have to prove that is the most concrete closure for which
the program is safe. Upper closure operator are isomorphic to Moore family
sowe prove that {X ∈ ℘(Σ+)|SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} is aMoore family. For doing so
we have only to prove that thi set contains the intersection of all its elements.
Consider X,Y ∈ {Z ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(Z)}. For hypothesis we have that:
∀P ∈P ∀Q ∈ Q .
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X ⇒ ∀W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ X)∧
(∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ Y ⇒ ∀W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W ⊆ Y )
So we have to prove that the same condition holds also for X ∩ Y . Suppose
that ∀P ∈ P ∀Q ∈ Q it exists Z in ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) such that Z ∈ X ∩ Y (indeed
Z ⊆ X and Z ⊆ Y ). For hypothesis SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X) and SecrH+I,η,(φ)(Y ) hold,
so ∀W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) we have thatW is contained inX andW is contained
in Y , namelyW ⊆ X∩Y . Therefore SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X∩Y ) holds. This result can
be easily extended to a generic intersection, so {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}
isMoore family. X
Nowwe have to prove that non-interference holds, i.e. for ρˆ def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) |
SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} it is true H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca. Suppose that it exists P1, P2 ∈ P
andQ1, Q2 ∈ Q such that LP1Mη+ = LP2Mη+∧LQ1Mφ+ = LQ2Mφ+, with LI(P1, Q1)Mρˆ+ 6=LI(P2, Q2)Mρˆ+. We cannote that LI(P1, Q1)M+ and LI(P1, Q1)M+ are inΥH+I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1),
in fact P1 ≡η P2 and Q1 ≡φ Q2. Let X1, X2 ∈ ℘(Σ+) defined as X1 def=LI(P1, Q1)Mρˆ+ and X2 def= LI(P1, Q1)Mρˆ+. For hypothesis we have that X1 6= X2
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but, due toX1, X2 ∈ ρˆ, we also have that SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X1) and SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X2).
Now, ifX2 6⊆ X1, we have LI(P1, Q1)M+ ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1) such that LI(P1, Q1)M+ ⊆
X1, whilst LI(P2, Q2)M+ ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P1, Q1) such that LI(P1, Q1)M+ 6⊆ X1: ab-
surd (for the hypothesis on X1). Similarly, if X2 ⊆ X1 we obtain the same
contradiction on X2. Therefore LP1Mη+ = LP2Mη+ ∧ LQ1Mφ+ = LQ2Mφ+ impliesLI(P1, Q1)Mρˆ+ = LI(P2, Q2)Mρˆ+. X
Finally we have to prove that the closure is the most concrete. Suppose the
contrary, i.e. it exists a domain ρ such that ρˆ 6v ρ and H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca holds.
Remember that ρˆ v ρ iff ρ ⊆ ρˆ. Take in account the case in which ρˆ ( ρ. At
this point we can note that it exists X ∈ ρ such that X /∈ ρˆ, i.e. for which
SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X) doesn’t hold. But this means that it exists P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q
such that ∃Z ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) . Z ⊆ X and ∃W ∈ ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) .W 6⊆ X . So
Z = LI(P1, Q1)M+, for some P1 ∈ P, Q1 ∈ Q andW = LI(P2, Q2)M+, for some
P2 ∈ P,Q2 ∈ Q, with P1 ≡η P2 ≡η P andQ2 ≡φ Q2 ≡φ Q due to the fact that
both the set belong to ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q). All this implies that LI(P1, Q1)Mρ+ ⊆ X
due to LI(P1, Q1)M+ ∈ X , whilst LI(P2, Q2)Mρ+ 6⊆ X due to LI(P2, Q2)M+ /∈ X .
Indeed LI(P1, Q1)Mρ+ 6= LI(P2, Q2)Mρ+, but this is impossible, in fact we had
supposed that H+[η]I(φ⇒ ρ)bca. So a domain like ρ doesn’t exist. X
This means that the set of elements in ℘(Σ+) for which Secr holds it corre-
sponds to the secret kernel of id, namely it coincides to the most concrete
domain forwhich non-interference holds. Thi abstraction is calledmost pow-
erful harmless attacker for HOANI and it is precisely the most precise attacker
for which the program is safe. Furthermore we can characterize the secret
kernel of a generic domain ρ.
Corollary 2.
Let η, φ ∈ ℘(Σ+):
KH+I,η,(φ)(ρ) = {X ∈ ρ | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}
Proof. By definition KH+I,η,(φ) = λρ .KH+I,η,(φ)(id)unionsq ρ, so we have to prove that
this domain is exactly {X ∈ ρ | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}. This means that {X ∈ ρ |
SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} has to be equal to {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)} unionsq ρ. Re-
member that two sets are the same one is include in the other and vice versa.
Consider an element Y ∈ {X ∈ ρ | SecrH+I,η,(φ)(X)}. Clearly for this element
Y ∈ ρ and SecrH+I,η,(φ)(Y ) hold, i.e. Y belongs to KH+I,η,(φ)(id) unionsq ρ. Similarly
the inverse inclusion holds.
3 Formalization
Software watermarking consists in the embedding of some extra informa-
tion, the signature or watermark, into a software for purposes such as intel-
lectual property protection. In fact such watermark is hidden and so only
19
who is able to extract that information could claim the rights of the software.
Moreover the signature should be indelible, in order to prevent the unwa-
termarking of the program. Looking at the software watermarking tech-
niques present today we can group them in several ways: we can group
them by purpose like authorship, fingerprinting, validation and licensing
[21]; we can group them by satisfied properties like robustness/fragility,
visibility/invisibility and multiplicity [21]; we can group them by extrac-
tion method like static and dynamic [2] (see [4, 2, 3, 21] for a taxonomy of
watermarking techniques). Despite the classification, in every software wa-
termarking technique can be identified three components. Let Imp be a pro-
gramming language and S a set of signatures. Following [8] we can define
the nomenclature below1.
1. Stegomarker M : S −→ Imp – a function that generates a program
which is the encoding of a given signature s ∈ S , i.e. it generates the
stegomark M(s) ∈ Imp.
2. Stegoembedder L : Imp × Imp −→ Imp – a function that generates a
program which is the composition of a stegomark and a cover pro-
gram to sign, i.e. it generates the stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) ∈ Imp, with
P ∈ Imp and s ∈ S.
3. Stegoextractor F : Imp −→ ℘(S) – a function that extracts the signa-
tures from a stegoprogram; for all s ∈ S must be s ∈ F(L(P,M(s))).
In the following, when L and M are clear from the context we denote the
stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) as Ps.
In this work we focus the attention on the classification of watermarking
techniques by insertion/extraction methods. This choice is led by the fact
that if we want to discover when a stegoprogram can be unwatermarked
or how a watermark can be avoided then we have to analyze how the se-
cret information is hidden and which is the way for to reveal or to extract it.
In static watermarking the signature is inserted in the cover program either
as data (e.g. an image, a string, et cetera) or code (e.g. in the code control
structure) so the stegomark can be extracted from the text of the program,
without the need to execute it [2]. Conversely, in dynamic watermarking the
signature is inserted in the program execution state (i.e. in its semantics)
and so requires the program to be executed in order to extract the stego-
mark [2]. So in the latter case there is the concept of enabling input, namely
a particular input sequence which makes the program enter a state which
represents the watermark. In addition to this two categories, in [8] the au-
thors proposed a technique which is different from both static and dynamic
1The prefix “stego” stands for steganographic, in fact software watermarking is in general
a steganogrphic method
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watermarking. It is called abstract watermarking and the idea is that the ste-
gomark is encoded in a way that it could be extracted by suitable static pro-
gram analysis, that is by abstract interpretation. This technique can be seen
like static watermarking because the extraction of the signature requires no
execution. But, at the same time, it can be seen like dynamic watermarking
because the stegomark is hidden in the semantics, though the execution of
the stegoprogram will not reveal the signature. So abstract watermarking
can be seen like both static and dynamic.
Starting from this observation, in [15] the author introduced the idea that
static and dynamic watermarking are instances of abstract watermarking.
In particular, they are instances of a common pattern which corresponds
to the program transformations making semantics complete. Complete ab-
stractions model precisely the full understanding of program semantics by
an approximate observer, i.e. concrete computations can be replaced, with
no loss of precision, with abstract one. So static and dynamic (and obviously
abstract) watermarking techniques can be seen like program transforma-
tionswhich generates stegoprogramswhose abstract semantics is complete.
The completeness is referred to a specific program property which repre-
sents the stegomark. In this work we try to formalize and extend this idea
in order to create a general framework for software watermarking, which is
able to describe almost every possible watermarking technique.
3.1 The framework
Aswe have seen in section 2.3we formalize the semantics of a programwith
its maximal finite traces semantics. This is reasonable because in software
watermarking we are interested only in the terminating computations of a
program andwe need to keep track of history of such executions, for model-
ing the enabling input in dynamicwatermarking. So the concrete domain of
computation is ℘(Σ+) and the program properties are defined as upper clo-
sure operators in that domain. For to model dynamic techniques, we need
to formalize the concept of enabling input. In fact these techniques reveal
the signature only executing the stegoprogram with a particular input. We
recall that Imp is a deterministic programming language and that the states
of a trace embeds the residual input sequence left to be “consumed” by the
program. So we can formalize the concept of enabling input like a state
property, i.e. like an upper closure operator in the domain ℘(Σ). Further-
more in static and abstract watermarking the extraction can be performed
with static analysis and so with abstract interpretation. Our idea is that
also in dynamic watermarking the stegoextractor can be implemented with
abstract interpretation. Finally we assume that the set P ⊆ Imp of cover
programs doesn’t contain programs that already encode a signature. Prac-
tically every software watermarking technique assumes to only deal with
cover programs which are “free of signatures”, indeed, before the embed-
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ding there is a preliminary step in which it is checked if the program to be
signed is watermarkable.
So the stegoextractor takes a stegoprogram, analyses it and returns the
signature encoded in the stegomark. This means that the encoded signa-
ture can be seen as a property of the stegomark’s semantics and therefore
of the stegoprogram’s semantics. In this view a stegoextractor is an ab-
stract interpreter that executes the stegoprogram in the abstract domain
β ∈ uco(℘(Σ∗)) that allows to observe the hidden signature. In order to
deal with dynamic watermarking we need to model the enabling input that
allows to extract the signature. Since the residual input stream is part of
the program state, the enabling input can be modeled as a state property
η ∈ uco(℘(Σ)). We specify a watermaking system as a tuple 〈L,M, β〉.
Definition 3 (Software Watermarking System).
Given L : Imp × Imp → Imp, M : S → Imp and β ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), the tuple
〈L,M, β〉 is a software watermarking system for programs in P and signatures in
S ifM is injective and there exists η ∈ uco(℘(Σ)) such that ∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S:
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ = λX . {LM(s)Mβ+(X) if X ∈ η(℘(Σ+))LP Mβ+(X) otherwise
X ∈ η(℘(Σ+))⇒ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
This means that when computing the semantics in the abstract domain
β, the stegoprogram L(P,M(s)) behaves like the stegomark M(s) on the
enabling inputs, and like the cover program P otherwise. It is possible to
reduce the precise extraction of the signature to a completeness problem.
To this end we associate the stegomarker M(·) with its semantic counter-
part M : S −→ uco(℘(Σ+)), which encodes a signature in a semantic pro-
gram property. In particular, given watermarking system 〈L,M, β〉 we de-
fineM def= λs.{LM(s)Mβ+,Σ+}. Indeed,M(s) provides a semantic representa-
tion of the signature s. By construction we have that ∀s ∈ S : β vM(s) and
this ensures that β is precise enough for extracting the signature. Moreover,
the abstract semantics computed on β of the stegoprogram reveals the wa-
termark M(s) under input η only if it is F-complete for η and M(s). This
means that the stegoembedder makes programs in a way that the stegoex-
tractor has a full comprehension of their semantics and so it is able to ex-
tract the property which represents the signature. Recalling the operator F
inducingF-completeness introduced in section 2.2.1, we can say that if Ps is
a stegoprogram then: LPsMβ+ = Fη,M(s)(LPsMβ+), i.e., LPsMβ+ ifF-complete for η
andM(s). So, recalling the operatorF inducingF-completeness introduced
in section 2.2.1, we can say that if Ps is a stegoprogram then:
LPsMβ+ = Fη,M(s)(LPsMβ+)
22
If LPsMβ+ is not F-complete then LPsMβ+ ◦ η 6= M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+ ◦ η. Even if η is
satisfied by X , we have that LPsMβ+(X) 6= M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) and so there is
no doubt that LPsMβ+(X) 6= LM(s)Mβ+. Instead, if LPsMβ+ is F-complete thenLPsMβ+ ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+ ◦ η holds. When η is satisfied by X , we have thatLPsMβ+(x) = M(s)◦LPsMβ+(x) and consequentlywe have that LPsMβ+(x) ∈M(s)
(see Figure 1). This means that LPsMβ+(x) is an element ofM(s) and so it rep-
resents the signature s. If η is not satisfied byX , the system should guaran-
tee that the abstraction of the stegoprogram doesn’t reveal the signature, so
we have to chose β and in a way that LP Mβ+ /∈ M(s), i.e. M(s)(LP Mβ+(X)) =
Σ+ minimizes false positive.
The different kinds of software watermarking techniques can be seen as
instances of Definition 3.
Static and abstract software watermarking corresponds to η = id and β de-
cidable (i.e. implementable whit static analysis). In this case the interpreta-
tion of the stegoprogram always reveals the stegomark, independently from
the input. Dynamic software watermarking corresponds to η 6= id and β
generic interpreter. In this case the concrete semantics of the stegoprogram
reveals the stegomark only when a particular input sequence is given.
Note that if the abstract semantics of the stegoprogram is complete, it may
well happen that the concrete semantics of the stegoprogram is not com-
plete, i.e. LPsM+ is not F-complete for η and M(s). This means that the
knowledge of the stegomarker may not be sufficient in order to extract the
signature. Finally, due to the fact that the F is idempotent, it provides also
a tamper detection method. In fact Fη,M(s)(LPsMβ+) = LPsMβ+. Every syntactic
transformation of the stegoprogram can be revealed. Let t : Imp −→ Imp be
an attacker, if Fη,M(s)(Lt(Ps)Mβ+) 6= Lt(Ps)Mβ+ then we can recognize that the
stegoprogram is tampered.
3.2 Properties
For a software watermarking technique it is desirable to know if it is a good
or bad technique or if it is better than another in some specific context of
interest. So it is necessary to define some properties that could help when
we want to measure the efficacy of a watermarking method and when we
want to compare watermarking techniques. In this section we briefly de-
scribe and then we formalize the most significant properties that a software
watermarking system could have, from a semantic point of view. Again
we take advantage of abstract interpretation and so we complete the defi-
nition of the formal framework just introduced above. The properties that
we will introduce are those which can be formalized semantically, not all
the possible properties can be described in this way. For example, data-rate
(capacity) [4] depends strictly by the implementation of the stegomarker, so
it is not an intrinsic property of thewatermarking system. Furthermore also
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Σ Σ+ω = M(s) for a given s ∈ S
η
x
β
LP Mβ+(x)
ω
ω ◦ LP Mβ+(x)
℘(Σ) ℘(Σ+)
LP Mβ+ 6= ω ◦ LP Mβ+LPsMβ+ = ω ◦ LPsMβ+
Σ Σ+
η
x
β
LS(P, s)Mβ+(x)
ω
℘(Σ) ℘(Σ+)
Figure 1: F-completeness for the stegoprogram
credibility doesn’t fit well in our semantic model, indeed it is a problem can
be only handled in a statistical way.
In the follow, all the properties refer to a software watermarking system
〈L,M, β〉, to a set of cover programs P and to a set of signatures S. With β
we indicate the extraction domain and with M(s) we indicate the domain
which encode semantically the signature s.
3.2.1 Resilience
Resilience concerns the capacity of a software watermarking system to be
immune to a certain type of attacks. Mainly we can figure out four of such
types.
Distortive attacks The attacker attempts to change the stegoprogram in or-
der to compromise the stegomark, i.e. it applies syntactic or semantic
transformations in order to make no more recoverable the signature
by the stegoextractor.
Collusive attacks The attacker compares different stegoprograms of the
same cover program in order to obtain informations on the stegomark.
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Doing so it could, for example, identify the location of the stegomark
within the stegoprogram and then remove it.
Subtractive attacks The attacker tries to eliminate the stegomark from the
stegoprogram so that it is no longer possible to extract the signature
(usually this attacks take place after that a preliminary analysis has
identified the location of the stegomark).
Additive attacks The attacker adds another stegomark into the stegopro-
gram so that the previous stegomark is “overwritten” or so that the
program contains more than one stegomark. In the latter case one
can’t realize who has first marked the cover program and then the
real author/owner can’t be determined.
Ideally, a software watermarking system is resilient, w.r.t. a particular kind
of attack, when it is immune to any attack of that type. Furthermore we
can divide the attacks in conservative and not conservative. The first maintain
unmodified the semantics of the program under attack, whilst the second
do not guarantee this (this attacks nullify the watermark but for doing so
have to alter some functionalities of the program).
We have to do a preliminary clarification. Subtractive attacks need to locate
the stegomark, so we fall back in problems of secrecy (explained below) and
collusive attacks. Resilience to additive attacks is a non interesting case,
indeed it is thought that software watermarking systems can’t be resilient
to this type of attacks. Finally, collusive attacks are strictly related to the
stegomark localization, so this type of resilience will be discussed with the
concept of secrecy. So it remains only one type of attack then, from now, we
consider the property of resilience as the resilience to distortive attacks.
An attacker can be seen like a program transformer t : Imp −→ Imp which
modifies programs preserving their semantic, i.e. ∀P ∈ P must be thatLP M+ = Lt(P )M+. Truly the real objective of the attacker is to preserve only
an abstraction of programs semantics, precisely the denotational semantics,
i.e. to preserve the input/output programs behavior. In fact the attacker
tries to modify as much as possible the program in order to compromise
the stegomark. So there will be program’s properties that the attacker pre-
serves and other that it does not preserve. So there will be abstractions
ψ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) such that ψ(LP M+) 6= ψ(Lt(P )M+). Can be defined the most
concrete property δt ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) preservable by t. So every property ψ
more abstract, δt v ψ, will be clearly preserved by t.
If δt v
d{M(s) | s ∈ S} then every stegoprogram, so the software water-
marking system, is protected against the attacker t. Otherwise, could be
that t preserves M(s) for certain signatures, in particular for those which
δt v M(s). So we can characterize which stegoprograms are immune to t
and which are not. In the worst case, when ∀s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s), the software
watermarking system is not able to contrast in any way the attacker t.
25
If, for some s, δt 6v M(s) we can measure how much the stegoprogram is
vulnerable w.r.t. t. We can calculate how much information about M(s) is
modifiable: M˜(s) = M(s)	 (δt unionsqM(s)) (see [11] for the details). Most con-
crete is M˜(s) and less resilient the stegoprogram is. Similarly we can work
on
d{M(s) | s ∈ S}, measuring how much the whole system is vulnerable.
So, to summarize, the property
d{M(s) | s ∈ S} induces a partition of the
possible attackers, in the following way.
Definition 4 (t-resilience).
A software watermarking system is:
. t-resilient if δt v
d{M(s) | s ∈ S}
. t-vulnerable if ∃s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
. t-ineffective if ∀s ∈ S . δt 6vM(s)
Furthermore, if an attacker t is conservative it must preserve the denota-
tional semantics, DenSem ∈ uco(℘(Σ+))2, of the original program sowe have
that δt v DenSem. In this context every property more abstract than DenSem
is preserved.
Definition 5 (Resilience).
A software watermarking system is resilient if
DenSem v
l
{M(s) | s ∈ S}
Therefore, in this last case, the system is t-resilient w.r.t any distortive (and
conservative) attacker t. A software watermarking system which exhibits
such behavior has not been yet found and it is an open research topic to
demonstrate its existence or not.
If the attacker is not conservative, so it is willing to lose some original pro-
gram functionality in order to nullify the stegomark, then is not necessary
that δt v DenSem. In this case we have a stronger formalization of the at-
tacker and it is not possible to assert that a software watermarking system
is resilient to any distortive attacker not conservative.
This formalization of resilience allows us to compare two watermark-
ing systems w.r.t. resilience. Given two software watermarking systems
A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, if it holds that
d{M1(s) | s ∈
S} v d{M2(s) | s ∈ S} then we have that {t | δt v {M1(s) | s ∈ S}} is
contained in {t | δt v {M2(s) | s ∈ S}}. Therefore A2 is, in general, more
resilient than A1.
2This domain is obtained from maximal finite traces semantics by the abstraction
DenSemα(x)
def= {σ ∈ Σ+ | ∃σ′ ∈ x . σ` = σ′` ∧ σa = σ′a}
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3.2.2 Secrecy
Secrecy concerns how much is hard to recover the stegomark embedded in
a stegoprogram. Ideally a software watermarking system is secret when is
impossible to extract the signature (and so the stegomark) from a stegopro-
gram without knowing the stegoextractor. In practice, secrecy can be seen
as the ability of the software watermarking system to make indistinguish-
able a set of signatures to the attacker. In thisway the attacker is also not able
to extract such signatures. Here comes the resilience to collusive attacks. A
watermarking system is resilient to collusive attacks when an attacker is not
able to view the difference between different stegoprograms related to the
same cover program (these stegoprograms contain different stegomark and
so different signatures). This concept can be formalized with higher-order
abstract non-interference, introduced in section 2.4.
The private input is the set of programs that have to be secret, i.e. all pos-
sible stegomark, so Q = {M(s) | s ∈ S}. Instead the public input is the
set of cover programs, so P = P . Now we can consider φ ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)), a
property that represents some stegomark, and so a set of signatures. We as-
sume that the attacker doesn’t have access to cover programs, so the abstrac-
tion of the public input is id. The system is safe if it holds non-interference
H
+[id]L(φ⇒ ρ)bca.
Definition 6 (φ-secrecy).
A software watermarking system is φ-secret, w.r.t. attacker ρ, if H+[id]L(φ⇒ ρ)bca
holds, i.e. if
∀P ∈ P,∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q .LQ1Mφ+ = LQ2Mφ+ ⇒ LL(P,Q1)Mρ+ = LL(P,Q2)Mρ+
This means that if we codify a cover programwith two different signatures,
which have the same property φ, then an attacker is not able to view differ-
ences between the stegoprograms generated, assuming that its observation
power is ρ. In this way all the signatures with the same property φ can be
used for generating stegoprograms resilient to collusive attacks from the at-
tacker ρ. The system is more secure, w.r.t. the attacker ρ, the greater is the
set of signatures for which it holds the non-interference defined above. In
particular when φ = >, with> = λx.Σ+, the system is said to be secretw.r.t.
the observer ρ. In this case the set of indistinguishable signatures is equal
to S and no properties can flow.
Definition 7 (Secrecy).
A software watermarking system is secret, w.r.t. attacker ρ, if H+[id]L(> ⇒ ρ)bca
holds, i.e. if
∀P ∈ P,∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q . LL(P,Q1)Mρ+ = LL(P,Q2)Mρ+
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Moreover, if we fix the property φ, i.e. a set of signatures, we can analyze for
which attacker the system is φ-secret. In this way we can characterize the
most concrete observer ρˆ for which the non-interference H+[id]L(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca
holds, called most powerful φ-secret attacker3. Clearly the analysis is useful
for any observer most concrete, or concrete as, β. In fact the system can’t be
secret for the attackers at least precise as the extractor.
Thus, the secrecy level of a watermarking system is given by the most
abstract property φ and by the most concrete observer ρˆ for which non-
interference H+[id]L(φ⇒ ρˆ)bca holds. The more φ is abstract and the more
the system is secret. Vice versa, the more ρˆ is concrete and the more the
system is secret. Observe that φ can range from id(all the signatures are
distinguishable) to > (no signature is distinguishable). If ρˆ, i.e., the most
powerful φ-secret attacker, is > then every attacker is able to distinguish
the signatures. Otherwise, the more ρˆ is less abstract w.r.t. > the more the
system is secret.
This formalization of secrecy allows us to compare two watermarking
systems w.r.t. secrecy. Given two software watermarking systems A1 =
〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, and consider the most powerful harm-
less attacker. If ρˆ1 v ρˆ2 we have that A1 is more secret, w.r.t. φ, than A2.
Indeed it is necessary a more precise (so most stronger) attacker for to void
φ-secrecy with A1.
3.2.3 Transparence
Transparence concerns the ability to make hard to discover if a generic pro-
gram is a stegoprogram. Ideally, a software watermarking system is trans-
parent when it is impossible to view differences between a program and the
related stegoprogram. So we can say that a software watermarking system
in invisible, w.r.t. a fixed observer, if the latter is not able to distinguish a
generic cover program from every stegoprogram generated starting from it.
Definition 8 (Invisibility).
A software watermarking system is invisible, w.r.t. attacker ρ, if
∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . LP Mρ+ = LPsMρ+
The greatest is the set of the observers for which the system is invisible and
the greatest is the level of transparence. So the characterization of the most
concrete observer ρˆ for which the system is invisible is a good measure of
the transparence of the software watermarking system. This observer ρ˜ is
called most powerful transparent attacker. This attacker can be characterized
with a slightly differentiation of the most powerful >-secret attacker. In
3This attacker can be derived calculating the secret kernel of higher-order abstract non-
interference for traces semantics, like showed in section 2.4
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fact a system, in order to be invisible w.r.t. an attacker has clearly to be
also >-secret w.r.t. that attacker. So, recalling the set of indistinguishable
elements for HOANI ΥH+I,η,(φ)(P,Q) introduced in Section 2.4, we can define
its counterpart for transparence, namely all the elements which have to be
indistinguishable for transparence. This is
ΥH+
L,id,(>)(P,M(s)) = {LL(P ′,M(s′))M+|P ′ ≡id P∧M(s′) ≡> M(s)}∪{LP M+}
These sets are collections of sets of traces that each secure abstraction must
not distinguish, i.e. that must be approximated in the same object. Then
we can continue the construction of the secret kernel as done in Section 2.4.
Clearly the analysis is useful for any observer most concrete, or concrete as,
β. In fact the system can’t be invisible for the attackers at least precise as the
extractor.
Similarly to what we have done for secrecy, given two software water-
marking systems A1 = 〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉, and their most
powerful harmless attackers we have that if KL1(id) v KL2(id) we have that
A1 is more transparent than A2.
3.2.4 Accuracy
Informally, a softwarewatermarking system is accurate if preserves the func-
tionalities of the cover program, i.e. the cover program and the stegopro-
gram have to exhibit the same observable behavior. This concept can be de-
fined as “behavior as experienced by the user” [4]. Precisely, the stegopro-
gram can do something (file modifications, additional network traffic, et
cetera) that the cover program doesn’t do, but this side-effects must be not
visible to the user. Clearly this definition is very loose and it depends on
what the user is able to observe regard the program execution.
A possible characterization, at semantic level, of this concept can be the fol-
low: the stegoprogram and the original program must have the same ob-
servable denotational semantics. This means that, fixed what the user is in-
terested to (or is able to) observe, the stegoprogram and the cover program
must exhibit the same input/output behavior w.r.t. the fixed observation
level.
Formally, we define an observational abstraction αO which characterizes
what is interesting to observe about the denotational semantics of programs.
Then it is required, so worth the accuracy, that the cover program P and a
generic stegoprogramPs are equivalentmodulo this abstraction, i.e. αO(LP MDen) =
αO(LPsMDen) [9].
Then let 〈DO,≤O〉 be a poset and αO : ℘(Σ) −→ DO be a function such that
(〈℘(Σ),⊆〉, αO, α+O, 〈DO,≤O〉) is a Galois connection. We say that two pro-
grams P,Q ∈ Imp are αO-observationally equivalent, regard the denotational
semantics, if and only if αO(LP MDen) = αO(LQMDen).
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Returning to software watermarking, a system is accurate, fixed an obser-
vational abstraction αO, if for each program P ∈ P and for each signature
s ∈ S is true that P is αO-observationally equivalent to Ps.
Definition 9 (Accuracy).
Given a poset 〈DO,≤O〉 and an observational abstraction αO : ℘(Σ) −→ DO,
such that 〈℘(Σ),⊆〉 −−−→←−−−αO
α+O 〈DO,≤O〉, we have that a software watermarking sys-
tem is accurate, w.r.t. αO, if:
∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . αO(LP MDen) = αO(LPsMDen)
For example, a reasonable observational abstraction could be the output
given to the user. In the language Imp there is a command for to catch the
values inserted by the user, but there is not a command for to show the re-
sults to the user. This can be simulated restricting a subset of a program’s
variables to store the values that have to be showed to the user. We can
consider Varout(P ) ⊆ varJP K the set of this kind of variables. The user who
wants to observe the output of the program P has easily to check the values
of the variables in this set. Imp provides functions ρ ∈ Env (environments)
which represent, in a determinate state, the binding from variables and val-
ues4. So, in a determinate state 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉 of program P , varJP K = dom(ρ).
We define domout(ρ) ⊆ dom(ρ) the set of output variables of environment ρ.
The abstraction that catches the output given to the user observes only the
values of those variables, so αO
def= αoutO : ℘(Σ) −→ ℘(Env) can be defined in
the following way:
αoutO (X)
def=
ρ′ ∈ Env
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∃ς ∈ X .
ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉,
dom(ρ′) = domout(ρ),
∀y ∈ domout(ρ) . ρ′(y) = ρ(y)
 (1)
In this case, αoutO (LP MDen) catches the input/output behavior, specified as
input inserted by the user and output showed to the user, of program P 5.
If we apply αoutO to definition 9 thenwe obtain that a software watermarking
system is accurate, w.r.t. αoutO , if:
∀P ∈ P ∀s ∈ S . αoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPsMDen)
As regarding accuracy, this is a property that is not directly compara-
ble among different watermarking techniques since it is defined w.r.t. the
observational abstraction of interest.
4See section 2.3 for the details
5Clearly this observation is useless for the programs which don’t interact with the user;
in this cases it is necessary to chose another type of observable abstraction, more suitable
for the context
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4 Validation
In this section we describe five common watermarking techniques and we
show how they can be formalized whit our framework. This techniques are
voluntarily chosen heterogeneous, in order to represent all software water-
marking typology (static, dynamic and abstract). In the follow, we indi-
cate with
d
M the reduced product of all the abstract stegomarkM(s), i.e.d
M
def= {M(s) | s ∈ S}.
4.1 Static graph-based watermarking
Static software watermarking technique, conceived by Venkatesan et al. [22],
where the signature (a natural number) is codified as a graphwhich is added
to the CFG6 of the cover program. In particular, a program whose CFG is
equal to the graph generated starting from the signature is derived and then
added to cover program in a way that its semantics remains unmodified,
like it is showed in figure 2. The nodes of the added graph are marked be-
fore the embedding, in order to be distinguishable from the nodes of the
original CFG at the extraction step.
Let E : N −→ G be a function that codify a signature in a graph. Let Mark :
Σ+ −→ G be a function that, given a trace σ, outputs the marked subgraph
of the CFG of σ for a certainmarking criterion7. The semantics LP Mβ+ extracts
the marked subgraph of the CFG of P , so the extraction domain β is:
β
def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∃g ∈ G . X = {σ ∈ Σ+ | Mark(σ) = g}} ∪ {Σ+}
So in β there are all the sets of traces whose CFG contains the same marked
graph. WithWs def= {σ ∈ Σ+ | E(s) = Mark(σ)} we indicate the set of traces
whose CFG contains the marked graph which codify the signature s. This
is a static technique so η = id. Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ = Ws and so M(s) =
{Ws,Σ+}. LetG def= {⊥,G}∪{G}. The domain β can be defined as β def= βγ◦βα
where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ G and βγ : G −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
g if ∀σ ∈ X . g = Mark(σ)
G otherwise
βγ
def= λg .

∅ if g = ⊥
{σ ∈ Σ+ | g = Mark(σ)} if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
6Control Flow Graph
7Building the CFG and locating its marked nodes are both task easily implementable
analyzing a program traces
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φff
CFG of P
CFG ofM(s)
CFG of L(P,M(s))
Figure 2: Static graph-based watermarking
Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s) def= M(s)γ ◦ M(s)α where M(s)α :
℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) andM(s)γ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
M(s)α
def= λX.

∅ if X = ∅
Ws if X ⊆ Ws
Σ+ otherwise
M(s)γ
def= λX.X
It is simple to see that for all signature swe haveM(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+))
and so β v M(s). Then we have to check if L is a stegoembedder w.r.t. β.
The input domain is id so we have to check if for all set of statesX we have
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) ∧ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
Clearly for every possible set of initial states, the CFG of L(P,M(s)) is the
same, i.e. it exists g ∈ G such that ∀σ ∈ LL(P,M(s))M+ we have g = CFG(σ).
For how the technique is designed, into g there is a marked subgraph equal
to E(s). So we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possible set of
initial states. Now, the CFG ofM(s) is exactly E(s) and it is marked by de-
sign, so LM(s)Mβ+(X) =Ws for every possible set of initial states. Therefore
we have ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ) .
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
We can also note that, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete
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for η andM(s). In fact we have:
LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η
Ws = M(s)(Ws)
Ws =Ws
Now let’s see the properties of this technique. The system is not resilient,
because it is not fully immune to distortive attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v d{M(s) |
s ∈ S}.
Proof. Suppose that DenSem v dM, so∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But
Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is for sure at least a trace with the same
initial and final state of a trace inWs but with Mark(σ) 6= E(s). For example,
take a program equals to L(P,M(s)) but in which all the nodes of its CFG
are unmarked. Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Ws) but they aren’t inWs, be-
cause this traces don’t have a marked subgraph. So there is a X for which
DenSem(X) 6⊆ dM(X) and hence DenSem 6v dM.
Indeed the system is vulnerable to control flow obfuscation techniques (ba-
sically the ones which modify the CFG). For example, a CFG flattening at-
tack is able to damage the stegomark. Let’s try to derive the most powerful
>-secret attacker for this technique. Like showed in Section 2.4, themost
powerful >-secret attacker for static graph-based watermarking is
KL,(id),>(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈Q
LL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}
and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms
related to the same cover program. Finally the system is also αoutO accurate,
indeed the behavior of the cover program is preserved w.r.t. this observa-
tion. Clearly for every program P and for every signature s it holds that
αoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPs)MDen). In fact the insertion of the marked graph
doesn’t affect the variables of the cover program (the added code is never
executed). So, with the same input, the cover program and the stegopro-
gram give the same output.
4.2 Path-based watermarking
Dynamic software watermarking technique, conceived by Collberg et al. [5],
where the signature (a natural number) is encodedby the sequence of choices
made at conditional statements during a particular execution of the pro-
gram. This execution is generated by a particular sequence of input val-
ues I0, I1, . . . Ik called enabling sequence. The embedder takes the program
code and it adds bogus branches in a way that the sequence of choices at
conditional statements make by the resulting program, with the enabling,
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input, is equal to the binary notation of the signature. With  we indicate
the empty sequence. Let Bin : N −→ {0, 1}? be a function that returns the
binary encoding of a natural number and Branch : Σ+ −→ {0, 1}? be a
function that extracts the sequence of choices at conditional statements in
a trace. For example, when the guard of an instruction is evaluated to tt it
can be assigned to this choice the value 1 and it can be assigned the value 0
if the guard is evaluated to ff. Let E : N −→ ℘(Σ+)8 the function:
E def= λk .
{
σ ∈ Σ+
∣∣∣∣∣ |σ| = n+ 1, Branch(σ) = Bin(k),σn = 〈C, 〈ρn, ιn〉〉, top(ιi) = 
}
The semantics LP Mβ+ extracts the sequence of choices at conditional state-
ments for the program P , so the domain β is
β
def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | k ∈ {0, 1}?, X = E(k)} ∪ {Σ+}
and it contains all the sets of traceswhich have done the same choices, when
all the input values are consumed. WithWs = E(s) we indicate the set of
traces for which, when all the input values are consumed, the sequence of
choices at conditional statements codify the signature s. This is a dynamic
technique, so η = ℘(I)∪{Σ+}, where I represents the set of states enabling
the watermark, i.e.
I def=
{
ς ∈ Σ
∣∣∣∣∣ ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉〉, |ι| = |I|,∀j ∈ [0, |I|) . top(next(ι)j) = Ij
}
The domain η can be defined as η def= ηγ ◦ ηα where ηα : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+)
and ηγ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
ηα
def= λX.
{
X if X ⊆ I
Σ+ otherwise
ηγ
def= λX.X
Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ = Ws and so M(s) = {Ws,Σ+}. Let N def= {⊥,N} ∪ {N}.
The domain β can be defined as β def= βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ N e
βγ : N −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
k ∈ N if ∀σ ∈ X . |σ| = n+ 1, σn = 〈Cn, 〈ρn, ιn〉〉
top(ιn) = , Branch(σ) = Bin(k)
N otherwise
βγ
def= λk .

∅ if k = ⊥
E(k) if k ∈ N
Σ+ otherwise
8This function is not necessary, it is only useful for a simpler reading of the text
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Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s) def= M(s)γ ◦ M(s)α where M(s)α :
℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) andM(s)γ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
M(s)α
def= λS.
{
Ws if X ⊆ Ws
Σ+ otherwise
M(s)γ
def= λX.X
It is simple to see that for all signature swe haveM(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+))
and so β v M(s). Then we have to check if L is a stegoembedder w.r.t. β.
The input domain is not id so we have to check if for all set of states X we
have
♠ X ∈ η(Σ)⇒ LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) ∧ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
♣ X /∈ η(Σ)⇒ LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LP Mβ+
If X ∈ η(Σ) then X ⊆ I. All such X contain states which encode the en-
abling input, so the choices at conditional statements made by L(P,M(s))
starting from states inX are equal to Bin(s). Sowehave that LL(L,M(s))Mβ+(X) =
Ws for every possible set of initial states that satisfy η. Now, the same
reasoning can be done for M(s), because it codify the signature by design
(starting from the sets of input states which encode the enabling input). SoLM(s)Mβ+(X) = Ws for every X ∈ η(Σ). Therefore we have that ♠ holds. If
X /∈ η(Σ) thenX 6⊆ I. All suchX don’t contain states which encode the en-
abling input, so the choices at conditional statements made by L(P,M(s))
starting from states inX are not equal to Bin(s). This choices are with high
probability the same of those made by P . Even better, it is very likely that
both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) and LP Mβ+ are equal to Σ+. Indeed we have that ♣
holds.
We can also note that, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete
for η andM(s). In fact we have, when X ∈ η(Σ):
LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η
Ws = M(s)(Ws)
Ws =Ws
Now let’s see the properties of this technique. The system is not resilient,
because it is not fully immune to distortive attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v d{M(s) |
s ∈ S}.
Proof. Suppose that DenSem v dM, so∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But
Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is for sure at least a trace with the same ini-
tial and final state of a trace inWs but with Branch(σ) 6= Bin(s). For example,
take a program equals toM(s) but in which is inserted an opaque predicate.
Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Ws) but they aren’t inWs, because this traces
have a different number of conditional statements. So there is a X for which
DenSem(X) 6⊆ dM(X) and hence DenSem 6v dM.
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Indeed the system is vulnerable to control flow obfuscation techniques. For
example, an edge-flipping attack and an opaque predicate insertion attack
are able to damage the stegomark. Like showed in Section 2.4, themost pow-
erful >-secret attacker for path-based watermarking is
KL,(id),>(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈Q
LL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}
and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms
related to the same cover program. Finally the system is also αoutO accurate,
indeed the behavior of the cover program is preserved w.r.t. this observa-
tion. Clearly for every program P and for every signature s it holds that
αoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPs)MDen). In fact the embedding algorithm guarantee
that the insertion/modification of the conditional statements doesn’t affect
the variables of the cover program. So, with the same input, the cover pro-
gram and the stegoprogram give the same output.
4.3 Abstract constant propagation watermarking
Abstract software watermarking technique, conceived by Cousot and Cousot
[8], where the signature (a natural number) is inserted into a particular vari-
able which, although being modified during program execution, it remains
constant modulo an integer n (after being initialized). Clearly the inser-
tion of the signature doesn’t alter the semantics of the cover program. In
practice, even if the programming languages imposes a maximum limit for
integers, the signature can be arbitrarily large, provided that it is decom-
posed into k parts, using the Chinese remainder theorem. In this case the
watermark is the composition of k partial watermarks which encode each
one a number smaller than the limit imposed by programming language. In
the following, it is assumed that such limit doesn’t exist and the signature
is inserted without decomposed it.
In the original program it is declared a newvariable wwhich have to hide the
value of s. Then two integer-valued polynomials init and iter are chosen
for, respectively, to initialize and to modify w. The instruction w := init(1)
(initialization) is inserted into a random point in the program, but on con-
dition that such a point always runs, while instruction w := iter(w) (iter-
ation) is inserted into a random point the (after the initialization). The
polynomials must satisfy the following conditions9: init(1) = s mod n and
iter(w) = s mod n. Therefore, once initialized, w remains constant modulo
n, even if its value changes in Z in each iteration.
For the formalization of this technique in the framework, we have to extend
the information contained in the states of execution traces. So, assuming
to have an enumeration of the programs in Imp, we insert in the state the
9For the generation of such polynomial one can take advantage of the Horner method [8]
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identifier of the program which contains it, i.e. Σ = 〈Com × Con × N〉. For
short, we write σi the identifier contained in the states of the trace σ. Now
we can define the relation≈⊆ Σ+×Σ+ such that for all σ, σ we have σ ≈ σ
iff σi = σi. It is straightforward to note that ≈ is an equivalence relation.
So, given a set of traces X we indicate with X/≈ its quotient set, i.e. the
set of its equivalence class induced by ≈. Let Zn be the (quotient) ring of
integers modulo n and Zn
def= {⊥,Zn} ∪ Zn. We assume to have a function
IsConstn : ℘(Σ+) × Lab −→ (Var −→ Zn) such that: given a set of traces
X and a label l, IsConstn(X, l)(y) returns the value of y modulo n if the
variable is constant in Zn into the set of traces X at label l. If the variable
is undefined it returns ⊥ and Zn if the variable is not constant modulo n10.
Finally Constn : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Zn) is defined as:
Constn
def= λX .
⋃
y∈Var
{
IsConstn(X, l)(y)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∃l ∈ Lab .IsConstn(X, l)(y) ∈ Zn
}
In short, this function returns all the values in Zn of the variables that are
constant modulo n into a set of traces (at some label). The semantics LP Mβ+
performs constant propagation modulo n for program P , so
β =
X ∈ ℘(Σ+)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃N ⊆ Zn .N 6= ∅∧
X = ⋃id∈N
{
Y ∈ ℘(Σ+)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀σ ∈ Y . σi = id∧Constn(Y ) = N
} ∪{Σ+}
The domain β contains all the sets of traces with the same values of the
variables constant modulo n. WithWs def= ⋃id∈N{X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∀σ ∈ X .σi =
id ∧ Constn(X) = {s mod n}} we indicate the set of traces which have a
constant variable that encode the signature s. This is an abstract technique
so η = id. Clearly LP Mβ+ =Ws and soM(s) = {Ws,Σ+}. The domain β can
be defined as β def= βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Zn) and βγ : Zn −→
℘(Σ+) are
βα
def= λX .

∅ if X = ∅
N if N ( Zn ∧N 6= ∅ ∧ ∀Xj ∈ X/≈ . Constn(Xj) = N
Zn otherwise
βγ
def= λN .

∅ if N = ∅⋃
id∈N
{
X ∈ ℘(Σ+)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀σ ∈ X .σi = id∧Constn(X) = N
}
if N /∈ {∅,Zn}
Σ+ otherwise
10This function implements a constant propagation analysis
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Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s) def= M(s)γ ◦ M(s)α where M(s)α :
℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) andM(s)γ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
M(s)α
def= λX.

∅ if X = ∅
Ws if X ⊆ Ws
Σ+ otherwise
M(s)γ
def= λX.X
It is simple to see that for all signature swe haveM(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+))
and so β v M(s). Then we have to check if L is a stegoembedder w.r.t. β.
The input domain is id so we have to check if for all set of statesX we have
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) ∧ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
Clearly for every possible set of initial states, the constant propagationmod-
ulo n of L(P,M(s)) is the same, i.e. it exists N ( Zn not empty such that
Constn(LL(P,M(s))Mβ+) = N . For how the technique is designed, N is the
set {s mod n}. So we have that LL(L,M(s))Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possible
set of initial states. Now, the constant propagation modulo n ofM(s) is ex-
actly {s mod n}, so LM(s)Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possible set of initial states.
Therefore we have ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ) .
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
We can also note that, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete
for η andM(s). In fact we have:
LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η
Ws = M(s)(Ws)
Ws =Ws
Now let’s see the properties of this technique. The credibility of the system
is high because, for all signature s, M(s) is the atomic closure of LM(s)Mβ+.
The system is not resilient, because it is not fully immune to distortive at-
tacks, i.e. DenSem 6v d{M(s) | s ∈ S}.
Proof. Suppose that DenSem v dM, so∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But
Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is for sure at least a trace with the same ini-
tial and final state of a trace inWs which belongs to a program that doesn’t
have a constant variable modulo n equal to s. So there is a X for which
DenSem(X) 6⊆ dM(X) and hence DenSem 6v dM.
Like showed in Section 2.4, themost powerful >-secret attacker for ab-
stract constant propagation watermarking is
KL,(id),>(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈Q
LL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}
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and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms
related to the same cover program. Finally the system is also αoutO accurate,
indeed the behavior of the cover program is preserved w.r.t. this observa-
tion. Clearly for every program P and for every signature s it holds that
αoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPs)MDen). In fact the code inserted by the stegoem-
bedder doesn’t affect the variables of the cover program (the added code
just add new variables and let untouched the variables of the cover pro-
gram). So the output variables of the cover program are the same of the
output variables of the stegoprogram.
4.4 Block-reordering watermarking
Static softwarewatermarking technique, conceived byDavidson andMyhrvold
[12], where the signature (a natural number) is codified as a permutation of
the basic blocks of CFG11 of the cover program. In particular a program,
whose CFG is equal to the graph which encode the signature, is generated
and then its instructions are substituted with the instructions of the cover
program, in a way that its semantics remains unmodified.
Let E : N −→ G be a function that codify a signature in a graph. Let CFG :
Σ+ −→ G be a function that, given a trace σ, outputs the CFG of σ12. The
semantics LP Mβ+ extracts the CFG of P , so the extraction domain β is:
β
def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | ∃g ∈ G . X = {σ ∈ Σ+ | CFG(σ) = g}} ∪ {Σ+}
So in β there are all the sets of traces with the same CFG. WithWs def= {σ ∈
Σ+ | E(s) = CFG(σ)} we indicate the set of traces whose CFG codifies the
signature s. This is a static technique so η = id. Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ =Ws and
soM(s) = {Ws,Σ+}. Let G def= {⊥,G} ∪ {G}. The domain β can be defined
as β def= βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ G and βγ : G −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
g if ∀σ ∈ X . g = CFG(σ)
G otherwise
βγ
def= λg .

∅ if g = ⊥
{σ ∈ Σ+ | g = CFG(σ)} if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s) def= M(s)γ ◦ M(s)α where M(s)α :
11Control Flow Graph
12Building the CFG is easily implementable analyzing a program trace
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℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) andM(s)γ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
M(s)α
def= λX.

∅ if X = ∅
Ws if X ⊆ Ws
Σ+ otherwise
M(s)γ
def= λX.X
It is simple to see that for all signature swe haveM(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+))
and so β v M(s). Then we have to check if L is a stegoembedder w.r.t. β.
The input domain is id so we have to check if for all set of statesX we have
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) ∧ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
Clearly for every possible set of initial states, the CFG of L(P,M(s)) is the
same, i.e. it exists g ∈ G such that ∀σ ∈ LL(P,M(s))M+ we have g = CFG(σ).
For how the technique is designed, this graph is equal to E(s), by design. So
we have that LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) =Ws for every possible set of initial states.
Now, the CFG ofM(s) is also E(s), so LM(s)Mβ+(X) =Ws for every possible
set of initial states. Therefore we have ∀X ∈ ℘(Σ) .
LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
We can also note that, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete
for η andM(s). In fact we have:
LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η
Ws = M(s)(Ws)
Ws =Ws
Now let’s see the properties of this technique. The system is not resilient,
because it is not fully immune to distortive attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v d{M(s) |
s ∈ S}.
Proof. Suppose that DenSem v dM, so∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But
Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is for sure at least a trace with the same
initial and final state of a trace inWs but with CFG(σ) 6= E(s). For example,
take a program equals toM(s) but in which is inserted an opaque predicate.
Clearly its traces are in DenSem(Ws) but they aren’t inWs, because this traces
have a different CFG. So there is a X for which DenSem(X) 6⊆ dM(X) and
hence DenSem 6v dM.
Indeed the system is vulnerable to control flow obfuscation techniques (ba-
sically the ones which modify the CFG). For example, a CFG flattening at-
tack is able to damage the stegomark. Like showed in Section 2.4, themost
powerful >-secret attacker for block-reordering watermarking is
KL,(id),>(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈Q
LL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}
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and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms
related to the same cover program. Finally the system is also αoutO accurate,
indeed the behavior of the cover program is preserved w.r.t. this observa-
tion. Clearly for every program P and for every signature s it holds that
αoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPs)MDen). In fact the reordering of nodes of the CFG
doesn’t affect the variables of the cover program (there are new variables
in the stegoprogram but, by design, these don’t interfere whit the variables
of the cover program). So, with the same input, the cover program and the
stegoprogram give the same output.
4.5 Dynamic graph-based watermarking
Dynamic softwarewatermarking technique, conceived byCollberg and Thom-
borson [2], where the signature (a natural number) is encoded by a graph al-
located in the dynamic memory (in the heap) of the program, during a par-
ticular execution of the program. This execution is generated by a particular
sequence of input values I0, I1, . . . Ik called enabling sequence. Given a sig-
nature, a graph that encode the signature and the code that build this graph
are generated. The embedder takes the program and it adds the code that
generates the parts of the graph in some locations of the cover program,
but this code is executed only with the enabling input. Furthermore the
code that builds the root of the graph is executed at last, so the root is the
last node of the graph that is inserted in the heap (this is done in order to
recognize the right graph in the heap at the extraction phase). With  we
indicate the empty sequence. Let E : N −→ G be a function that codify a
signature in a graph and Heap : H −→ ℘(G) be a function that extracts the
graphs memorized in an heap. For the formalization of this technique in
the framework, we have to extend the information contained in the states
of execution traces. So we insert in the state the heap of the program at the
current state, i.e. Σ = 〈Com× Con×H〉. So σ = 〈C, ζ,H〉, whereH ∈ H is an
heap. Let E : G −→ ℘(Σ+)13 the function:
E def= λg .
σ ∈ Σ+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
|σ| = n+ 1, σn = 〈Cn, 〈ρn, ιn〉,Hn〉,
top(ιn) = , g ∈ Heap(Hn), root(g) ∈ Heap(Hn)
∀j ∈ [0, n) . root(g) /∈ Heap(Hj)

The semantics LP Mβ+ extracts the graph (whit the root inserted at last) memo-
rized in the heap of the program P when all the input values are consumed,
so the domain β is
β
def= {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | g ∈ G, X = E(g)} ∪ {Σ+}
and it contains all the sets of traces which have the same graph (whit the
root inserted at last) memorized in the heap, when all the input values are
13This function is not necessary, it is only useful for a simpler reading of the text
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consumed. WithWs = E(E(s)) we indicate the set of traces for which, when
all the input values are consumed, the heap contains the encoding of the
signature s. This is a dynamic technique, so η = ℘(I) ∪ {Σ+}, where I
represents the set of states enabling the watermark, i.e.
I def=
{
ς ∈ Σ
∣∣∣∣∣ ς = 〈C, 〈ρ, ι〉,H〉, |ι| = |I|,∀j ∈ [0, |I|) . top(next(ι)j) = Ij
}
The domain η can be defined as η def= ηγ ◦ ηα where ηα : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+)
and ηγ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
ηα
def= λX.
{
X if X ⊆ I
Σ+ otherwise
ηγ
def= λX.X
Clearly LM(s)Mβ+ = Ws and so M(s) = {Ws,Σ+}. Let G def= {⊥,G} ∪ {G}.
The domain β can be defined as β def= βγ ◦ βα where βα : ℘(Σ+) −→ G e
βγ : G −→ ℘(Σ+) are
βα
def= λX .

⊥ if X = ∅
g ∈ G if ∀σ ∈ X .
|σ| = n+ 1, σn = 〈Cn, 〈ρn, ιn〉,Hn〉
g ∈ Heap(Hn), root(g) ∈ Heap(Hn)
∀j ∈ [0, n) . root(g) /∈ Heap(Hj), top(ιn) = 
G otherwise
βγ
def= λg .

∅ if g = ⊥
E(g) if g ∈ G
Σ+ otherwise
Instead M(s) can be defined as M(s) def= M(s)γ ◦ M(s)α where M(s)α :
℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) andM(s)γ : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) are
M(s)α
def= λS.
{
Ws if X ⊆ Ws
Σ+ otherwise
M(s)γ
def= λX.X
It is simple to see that for all signature swe haveM(s)(℘(Σ+)) ⊆ β(℘(Σ+))
and so β v M(s). Then we have to check if L is a stegoembedder w.r.t. β.
The input domain is not id so we have to check if for all set of states X we
have
♠ X ∈ η(Σ)⇒ LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+(X) ∧ LM(s)Mβ+(X) = LM(s)Mβ+
♣ X /∈ η(Σ)⇒ LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) = LP Mβ+
If X ∈ η(Σ) then X ⊆ I. All such X contain states which encode the en-
abling input, so the L(P,M(s)) executes the code which builds the graph
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E(s) in the heap. So we have that LL(L,M(s))Mβ+(X) = Ws for every possi-
ble set of initial states that satisfy η. Now, the same reasoning can be done
for M(s), because it codify the signature by design (starting from the sets
of input states which encode the enabling input). So LM(s)Mβ+(X) =Ws for
every X ∈ η(Σ). Therefore we have that ♠ holds. If X /∈ η(Σ) then X 6⊆ I.
All such X don’t contain states which encode the enabling input, so the
L(P,M(s)) doesn’t execute the code which build E(s) in the heap. So the
objects built in the heap are with high probability the same of those built
by P . Even better, it is very likely that both LL(P,M(s))Mβ+(X) and LP Mβ+ are
equal to Σ+. Indeed we have that ♣ holds.
We can also note that, for every signature s, LL(P,M(s))Mβ+ is F-complete
for η andM(s). In fact we have, when X ∈ η(Σ):
LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η = M(s) ◦ LPsMβ+(X) ◦ η
Ws = M(s)(Ws)
Ws =Ws
Now let’s see the properties of this technique. The system is not resilient,
because it is not fully immune to distortive attacks, i.e. DenSem 6v d{M(s) |
s ∈ S}.
Proof. Suppose that DenSem v dM, so∀X ∈ ℘(Σ+) it holds that DenSem(X) ⊆d
M(X). Let X = Ws, for a generic signature s, so
d
M(X) = Ws. But
Ws ( DenSem(Ws), because there is for sure at least a trace with the same
initial and final state of a trace in Ws but without E(s) among the objects
memorized in the heap. For example, take a program equals toM(s) but in
which the code that inserts the root node is duplicated. Clearly the traces of
this program are in DenSem(Ws) but they aren’t inWs, because in this traces
not only the last heap contains the root of the graph. So there is aX for which
DenSem(X) 6⊆ dM(X) and hence DenSem 6v dM.
Indeed the system is vulnerable to techniques that modifies the structure
of the runtime objects created. For example, a node-splitting attack is able
to damage the stegomark (if it modifies the structure of the root node of
the graph then the extractor is not able to recognize the stegomark). Like
showed in Section 2.4, themost powerful>-secret attacker for dynamic graph-
based watermarking is
KL,(id),>(id) = {X ∈ ℘(Σ+) | P ∈ P, X =
⋃
Q∈Q
LL(P,Q)M+} ∪ {Σ+}
and it abstracts in the same object the traces of all possible stegoprograms
related to the same cover program.
Finally the system is also αoutO accurate, indeed the behavior of the cover
program is preserved w.r.t. this observation. Clearly for every program P
and for every signature s it holds thatαoutO (LP MDen) = αoutO (LPs)MDen). In fact
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the embedding algorithm guarantee that the code inserted doesn’t affect the
variables of the cover program. So, with the same input, the cover program
and the stegoprogram give the same output.
5 Comparison
Until now we have formalized and validated the framework. The next step
is clearly to show how to use this tool for performing comparisons between
different softwarewatermarking systems, in order to be able to chose a tech-
nique rather than another according to the needs. For example, if we are
interested in resilience so we can compare two systems to determine which
is the best, regard this property.
5.1 Resilience
In Section 3.2 we have discussed how different watermarking systems A1 =
〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉 could be compared w.r.t. resilience by
comparing the degree of abstraction of
d{M1(s) | s ∈ S} andd{M2(s) | s ∈
S}. Of course it may happen that these two abstractions are not comparable.
In this case what we can do is to compare their resilience w.r.t. a specific
distortiv attack.
In this context we consider an attacker every possible program transfor-
mation. In fact there are specific programs used with the purpose to defeat
software watermarking, the “real” attackers14, but also there are programs
which accidentally can damage the watermark. For example, most code
optimization techniques could interfere with software watermarking. Like
in [10] we model the attackers as semantic program transformations, con-
sidering that their syntactic counterpart can always be derived. Indeed, any
syntactic program transformer t, altering the code of P and returning a new
program P ′, induces a corresponding semantic transformer t turning LP M+
into LP ′M+ [9].
5.1.1 Edge-flipping
The edge-flipping obfuscation inverts the branches of every conditional state-
ment of a program, namely it exchanges the code executed in the true branch
with the code executed in the false branch, for every conditional command.
In order to preserve the program semantics, the obfuscation also have to
replace every branch condition, called guard, with its negate.
14In this category we found the obfuscation techniques
44
The semantic transformation tef : ℘(Σ+) −→ ℘(Σ+) is defined as:
tef(X) def= {tef(σ) | σ ∈ X}
tef(〈C, ζ〉σ) def=

〈C, ζ〉tef(σ) if C = L : stop; ∨
C = L : A→ L′;
〈L : ¬B → {LF , LT }; , ζ〉tef(σ) if C = L : B → {LT , LF };
The most concrete preserved property is
δtef =
⊔
P∈Imp
{X ⊆ Σ+ | Pres
P,tef
(X)}
where Pres
P,tef
(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒⋃{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tef(Y )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of tracesX is preserved by edge-flipping transforma-
tion if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by
inverting every conditional branch and negating the related guard.
5.1.2 Opaque predicate insertion
Let I : Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a preliminary static analysis that
given a program returns the subset of its labels where it is possible to in-
sert opaque predicates. Usually the preliminary static analysis consists of
a combination of liveness analysis and static analysis. Given a program P ,
we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K of labels that the preliminary static
analysis has classified as candidate for opaque predicate insertion. Let Pt a
true opaque predicate, i.e. a boolean expression that is always evaluated to
tt, let Lˆ a co-label of P , i.e. Lˆ /∈ labJP K, and let L˜ a random label of P . We
write with lab(ς) the label of the command contained in the state ς , i.e. if
ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then lab(ς) = labJCK.
The semantic transformation topi : ℘(Σ+)×℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) is defined as:
topi(X, IP ) def= {topi(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
topi(〈C, ζ〉σ, IP ) def=
〈C, ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if lab(〈C, ζ〉) /∈ IP
〈L : Pt → {Lˆ, L˜}; , ζ〉〈Lˆ : A→ L′; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if lab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ I
P∧
C = L : A→ L′;
〈L : Pt → {Lˆ, L˜}; , ζ〉〈Lˆ : B → {LT , LF }; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if lab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ I
P∧
C = L : B → {LT , LF };
〈L : Pt → {Lˆ, L˜}; , ζ〉〈Lˆ : stop; , ζ〉topi(σ, IP ) if lab(〈C, ζ〉) ∈ I
P∧
C = L : stop;
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The most concrete preserved property is
δtopi =
⊔
P∈Imp
{X ⊆ Σ+ | Pres
P,topi
(X)}
where Pres
P,topi
(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒⋃{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = topi(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of tracesX is preserved by opaque predicate insertion
if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces inX by inserting
opaque predicate Pt at program points indicated by IP .
5.1.3 Dead code elimination
Let I : Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a preliminary static analysis that
given a program returns the subset of its labels which correspond to com-
mands that can be eliminatedwithout affecting the behavior of the program
(dead code). Usually the preliminary static analysis consists of dead/faint
variable analysis. Given a program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆
labJP K of labels that the preliminary static analysis has classified as dead
code. We assume that conditional commands can’t be classified as dead
code. We write with lab(ς) the label of the command contained in the state
ς , i.e. if ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then lab(ς) = labJCK.
The semantic transformation tdce : ℘(Σ+) × ℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) is defined
as15:
tdce(X, IP ) def= {tdce(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tdce(σ, IP ) def= Elimination(σ, IP )
The most concrete preserved property is
δtdce =
⊔
P∈Imp
{X ⊆ Σ+ | Pres
P,tdce
(X)}
where Pres
P,tdce
(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒⋃{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tdce(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of tracesX is preserved by dead code elimination if it
contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces in X by eliminating
every command indicated by IP .
15See appendix A for the algorithm Elimination
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5.1.4 Loop-unrolling
The easiest looping constructs to unroll are for-loops. Whenever a program
P includes a for-loopF , wewriteF ∈ fors(P ). More formally, F ∈ fors(P )
iff F def= {G, I} ∪H and F ⊆ P . The command G def= lG : X < E → {lH , lO};,
with lG 6= h and lG 6= lO, implements a branching named guard. As F
always starts with the evaluation of its guard, we have that lG is the en-
trypoint of F , labJF K ∩ labJP \ F K = ∅ and sucJP \ F K ∩ labJF K ⊆ {lG}.
The guard is satisfied as long as X ∈ Var is less16 than E ∈ Exp. If the
guard is not satisfied, the for-loop ends transferring the control flow at en-
trypoint lO /∈ labJF K. Otherwise, the execution goes on through H , a set
of commands named body, and eventually through an increment command
I
def= lI : X := X + E′ → lG;, with lI 6= lG and lI = lH ∨ lI ∈ sucJHK17.
We formally define H as the collection of all the commands of P that are
reachable from G without going through I , i.e., H def= lfp⊆flow(P ), where
flow(P )(Q) def= {C ∈ P \ {I} | labJCK = sucJGK ∨ ∃C ′ ∈ Q . labJCK = sucJC ′K}.
We require lG, lI /∈ labJHK. We expect bothX and the variables in E and E′
not to be assigned inside H . We require X not to be used in E or E′.
Finite partial trace 〈G, ζ〉η〈I, ζ ′〉 ∈ LF M⊕ is an iteration of for-loop F , where
η ∈ LHM⊕; if H = ∅ then η = . A maximal trace σ ∈ LF M⊕ is a sequence
of terminating iterations followed by a state with the command at label lO.
Along the trace, the values ofE andE′ do not change, while the value ofX ,
though constant throughout each iteration, increases by E′ from one itera-
tion to another. Thus, if ζ is a context in a state of σ ∈ LF M⊕, we can predict
how many increments X still has to undergo, i.e., the number of the itera-
tions from ζ till the end of σ18. We just need to define αF : conJF K −→ N
such that
αF (ζ)
def=

⌊
(EJEKζ−EJXKζ)+(EJE′Kζ−EJXKζ)
EJE′Kζ
⌋
if EJEKζ ≥ EJXKζ
0 otherwise
We let τ be the total number of iterations of σ. Along σ ∈ LF M⊕ iterations
are naturally unfolded, i.e., they come sequentially one after another. In the
original programF they fold because any commandC ∈ F , although occur-
ring in many different iterations, always appears with the same entrypoint
labJCK.
Loop-unrolling changes labels in the following way: given the so-called un-
rolling factor u ∈ N, it makes all and only the occurrences of C at iterations
kmodu have the same label (with 0 ≤ k < τ ), thus partitioning the iterations
16For short, we ignore similar kinds of for-loops which use >, ≤ or ≥ as comparison
operator
17Notice that I makes the control flow return to the guard again
18Actually we only need the environment ρ contained in ζ
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of σ into u classes. Only iterations from the same class fold together. So the
code of the unrolled loop is u times longer than F and each of its iterations
sequentially executes the task ofunative iterations. In thisworkwe consider
only the case in which the total number of iterations is known (it’s constant)
and so we can set u = τ . This is also the standard optimizing behavior of
most compiler, like gcc. So we assume that fors(P ) contains only the for-
loops which have a constant number of iterations19 and that iters(F ) re-
turns the number of iterations of F ∈ fors(P ). Let I : Imp −→ ℘(Lab×Lab)
be the result of a preliminary static analysis that given a program returns
the for-loops that can be unrolled. It represents the loop by mean a pair
of labels which identify the guard and the increment of the loop. Given a
program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K × labJP K of pairs of
labels that the preliminary static analysis has classified as representative of
loops that can be unrolled. We write with lab(ς) the label of the command
contained in the state ς , i.e. if ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then lab(ς) = labJCK.
The semantic transformation tlu : ℘(Σ+)×℘(Lab×Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) is defined
as20:
tlu(X, IP ) def= {tlu(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tlu(σ, IP ) def= Unroll(X, IP )
The most concrete preserved property is
δtlu =
⊔
P∈Imp
{X ⊆ Σ+ | Pres
P,tlu
(X)}
where Pres
P,tlu
(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒⋃{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tlu(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
This means that a set of traces X is preserved by loop-unrolling trasforma-
tion if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces inX by sub-
stituting the loops at program points indicated by IP with their sequences
of iterations.
5.1.5 Loop-invariant code motion
In this context we assume that only assignments can be moved outside the
loops. Let I : Imp −→ ℘(Lab) be the result of a preliminary static analy-
sis that given a program returns the subset of its labels which correspond
to commands that can be moved without affecting the behavior of the pro-
gram. Usually the preliminary static analysis consists of reaching defini-
tions analysis. Given a program P , we assume to know the set IP ⊆ labJP K
19We need a preliminary analysis of program P
20See appendix A for the algorithm Unroll
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of labels that the preliminary static analysis has classified as loop invari-
ant. For every l ∈ IP it’s trivial to retrieve the for-loop F ∈ fors(P )21
which contains the command at label l. This can be also done only ob-
serving a trace of the program. So we assume to have a function entry
that retrieve the label of the loop’s guard related to the loop which con-
tains the command with label l, namely lG = entry(l) iff F = {G, I} ∪H ,
l ∈ labJH ∪ IK and lG = labJGK. We assume also to have a function exit that
retrieve the label of the command just next the loopwhich contains the com-
mand with label l, namely lO = exit(l) iff F = {G, I} ∪ H , l ∈ labJH ∪ IK
and G = lG : B → {lH , lO}. Let Lˆ a co-label of P , i.e. Lˆ /∈ labJP K. We
write with lab(ς) the label of the command contained in the state ς , i.e. if
ς = 〈C, ζ〉 then lab(ς) = labJCK.
The semantic transformation tlicm : ℘(Σ+) × ℘(Lab) −→ ℘(Σ+) is defined
as22:
tlicm(X, IP ) def= {tlicm(σ, IP ) | σ ∈ X}
tlicm(σ, IP ) def= Motion(σ, IP )
The most concrete preserved property is
δtlicm =
⊔
P∈Imp
{X ⊆ Σ+ | Pres
P,tlicm
(X)}
where Pres
P,tlicm
(X) if and only if:
∀Y ⊆ LP M+ . Y ⊆ X ⇒⋃{Z ⊆ Σ+ | Z = tlicm(Y, IP )} ⊆ X
Thismeans that a set of tracesX is preserved by loop-invariant codemotion
transformation if it contains all the traces that can be obtained from traces
in X by moving each command, at program points indicated by IP , just
before (outside) the loop that contains it.
Table 1: Resilience
tef topi tdce tlu tlicm
Block-reordering 3 7 3 7 3
Static graph-based 3 7 3 7 3
Dynamic graph-based 3 3 3 3 3
Path-based 7 7 3 7 3
Abstract const. prop. 3 3 3 3 3
21Function defined formally in page 47
22See appendix A for the algorithmMotion
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Results
Let’s see an example. Static graph-based watermarking is topi-ineffective.
This means that ∀s ∈ S . δtopi 6v M(s). We prove that the negation of this
proposition lead to an absurd. So, suppose that ∃s ∈ S . δtopi v M(s). In-
deed, for every set of traces X we have δtopi(X) ⊆M(s)(X). Take X = Ws.
In this case M(X) = Ws but clearly Ws ( δtopi(Ws). In fact, due to esten-
sivity, Ws ⊆ δtopi(Ws) and by the fact that PresP,topi(Ws) doesn’t hold we
have that Ws /∈ δtopi . Absurd. The reasoning about resilience of the other
techniques is similar.
The formalization of both the watermarking techniques and the dis-
tortive attacks in the semantic setting has allowed us to formally prove the
resilience of the considered watermarking systems w.r.t. the distortive at-
tacks described above. Table 1 summarizes our results by showing which
watermarking systems is resilient (3) w.r.t. an attack and which one is not
(7). We can observe that path-base watermarking is not resilient w.r.t. edge-
flipping but it is resilientw.r.t. dead-code elimination. Interestingly, thewa-
termarking system based on abstract constant propagation is resilient w.r.t.
every attack, this means that it embeds the signature in an abstract prop-
erty that is preserved by all the considered attacks. Thus, if we want to
develop a watermaking system resilient to common obfuscation techniques
we should encode the signature in an abstract property implied by denota-
tional semantics.
5.2 Secrecy and Transparence
In Section 3.2 we have discussed how different watermarking systems A1 =
〈L1,M1, β1〉 and A2 = 〈L2,M2, β2〉 could be compared w.r.t. secrecy and
transparence based on the comparison of their most powerful harmless at-
tacks ρˆ1 and ρˆ2. Also in this case it may happen that the two abstractions
are not comparable. In this case we compare secrecy and transparence w.r.t.
particular observations. Let us denote with Ocfg ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) the abstract
interpreter that computes the control flow graph of programs, and with
Oacp ∈ uco(℘(Σ+)) the abstract interpreter that performs the analysis of
constant propagationmodulo n, with n ∈ N. Note thatOcfg is exactly the ex-
traction domain β of block-reordering watermarking 4.4 andOacp is exactly
the extraction domain β of abstract constant propagation watermarking 4.3.
Results
Let’s see two example. Static graph-basedwatermarking is not>-secretw.r.t
Ocfg. Let ρ = Ocfg, i.e., the semantic counterpart of Ocfg. ∀P ∈ P ∀s, s′ ∈ S
we have that LL(P,M(s))Mρ+ 6= LL(P,M(s′))Mρ+. In fact ρ is more concrete
than the abstraction domain of the technique and so it is able to view differ-
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Table 2: Secrecy & Transparence
Secrecy Transparence
Ocfg Oacp Ocfg Oacp
Block-reordering – – φ > 7 3
Static graph-based – – φ > 7 3
Dynamic graph-based φ > φ > 3 3
Path-based φ > φ > 7 3
Abstract const. prop. φ > – – 3 7
ence between any stegoprogram. Block-reordering watermarking is trans-
parent w.r.t Oacp. Let ρ = Oacp, i.e., the semantic counterpart of Oacp. ∀P ∈
P ∀s ∈ S we have that LP Mρ+ = LL(P,M(s′))Mρ+. In fact the reordering of
the basick block of the P doesn’t alter the values of the program’s variables.
So the constant propagation, modulo n, computed on P and every possible
stegoprogram returns the same results. The reasoning about resilience of
the other techniques is similar.
Given the semantic formalization of the considered watermarking sys-
tems and of the two observers introduced above, we provide a formal proof
of the secrecy and transparence of these watermarking systems w.r.t. Ocfg
and Oacp. Table 2 summarizes our results. For example, block-reordering
watermarking is not >-secret and it is not φ-secret, for any possible φ, w.r.t.
Ocfg. Instead it is >-secret, and so φ-secret for all possible φ, w.r.t. an ob-
server which look at Oacp. Moreover, abstract constant propagation water-
marking is invisible w.r.t. Ocfg while it is not invisible w.r.t. Oacp. So, as we
can see, all this techniques are not invisible only w.r.t. the observer which
are more precise than
d{M(s) | s ∈ S}.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduce a semantics-based definition of software water-
marking that is general enough to allow the specification of the static, ab-
stract and dynamic watermarking techniques. Indeed, all these techniques
can be seen as the exploitation of a completeness hole for the insertion of
the signature in an efficient way. Only attacks that are complete w.r.t. the
semantic encoding of the signature are able to observe the signature and po-
tentially tamper with it. This means that the abstract domain used for the
semantic encoding of the signature M(s) acts like a secret key that allows
to disclose the signature to attackers that are complete w.r.t. M(s).
Regarding the quality of awatermarking scheme our general framework
provides a formal setting where to prove the efficiency of a watermarking
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schemew.r.t. resilience, secrecy, transparence and accuracy. To validate our
theory we have proved the efficiency of five known watermarking systems.
Thus, we provide a general theory where researchers can provide formal
evidence of quality of the watermarking system that they propose. We be-
live that this is an important contribution that can be considered as the first
step towards a formal theory for software-watermarking where new and
existing techniques can be certified w.r.t. their efficiency.
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Appendices
A Algorithms
Algorithm 1 Elimination
Input σ, I
1: for all l ∈ I do
2: Let σi such that lab(σi) = l
3: l′ ← lab(σi+1)
4: j ← 0
5: while j < |σ| do // |σ| is updated at every cycle
6: Let σj = 〈Cj , ζj〉
7: if lab(σj) = l then
8: Let σj+1 = 〈Cj+1, ζj+1〉
9: σj+1 ← 〈Cj+1, ζj〉
10: σj ← ∅
11: j ← j − 1
12: else
13: if Cj = L : A→ l; then
14: σj ← 〈L : A→ l′; , ζj〉
15: if Cj = L : B → {l, LF }; then
16: σj ← 〈L : B → {l′, LF }; , ζj〉
17: if Cj = L : B → {LT , l}; then
18: σj ← 〈L : B → {LT , l′}; , ζj〉
19: j ← j + 1
Output σ
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Algorithm 2 Unroll
• Every label l ∈ labJP K mustn’t have any number for apex
Input σ, I
1: for all 〈lG, lI〉 ∈ I do
2: Let σi = 〈Ci, ζi〉 such that lab(σi) = lG
3: Let σj = 〈Cj , ζj〉 such that lab(σj) = lI
4: Let X be the variable of the guard in Ci, i.e. Ci = lG : X < E → {lH , lO};
5: Let X be the variable in the increment Cj , i.e. Cj = lI : X := X + E˙ → lG;
6: Let e˙ be the value of expression E˙ computed in context ζj
7: iters← ordered list of pairs 〈i, j〉 such that:
i < j, lab(σi) = lG, lab(σj) = lO,∀k ∈ (i, j) . lab(σk) 6= lO
8: for all 〈i, j〉 ∈ iters do // in list order
9: m← 0
10: for k = i to j − 1 do
11: Let σk = 〈Ck, 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
12: if lab(σk) = lG then
13: m← m+ 1
14: if m > 1 then
15: L← lGm−1
16: ρk ← ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−me˙]
17: else
18: L← lG
19: σk ← 〈L : skip→ lHm; 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
20: if lab(σk) = lI then
21: σk ← 〈lIm : skip→ lGm; , 〈ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−me˙], ιk〉〉
22: if lab(σk) 6= lG ∧ lab(σk) 6= lI then // so Ck ∈ H
23: if Ck = L : B → {LT , LF }; then
24: B′ ← B[X ← [ X + (m− 1)e˙]
25: Ck ← Lm : B′ → {LmT , LmF };
26: if Ck = L1 : A→ L2; then
27: A′ ← A[X ←[ X + (m− 1)e˙]
28: Ck ← Lm1 : A′ → Lm2 ;
29: σk ← 〈Ck, 〈ρk[X ←[ ρk(X)−me˙], ιk〉〉
30: Let σj−1 = 〈Cj−1, ζj−1〉
31: σ ← σ0 . . . σi . . . σj−1〈lHm : X := X+ (m−1)e˙→ lO; , ζj−1〉σj . . . σ|σ|−1
Output σ
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Algorithm 3Motion
Input σ, I
1: for all l ∈ I do
2: Let σk = 〈Cl, ζk〉 such that lab(σk) = l
3: Let X be the variable assigned in Cl, i.e. Cl = l : X := El → l′;
4: Let e be the value of expression El computed in context ζj
5: lG ← entry(l)
6: lO ← exit(l)
7: iters← ordered list of pairs 〈i, j〉 such that:
i < j, lab(σi) = lG, lab(σj) = lO,∀k ∈ (i, j) . lab(σk) 6= lO
8: Let 〈i, j〉 the first element of iters
9: w ← 0
10: for all 〈i, j〉 ∈ iters do // in list order
11: σ′ ← σw . . . σi−2
12: Let σi−1 = 〈Ci−1, ζi−1〉
13: if Ci−1 = L : A→ lG; then
14: σ′ ← σ′〈L : A→ Lˆ; ζi−1〉〈Lˆ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
15: if Ci−1 = L : B → {lG, LF }; then
16: σ′ ← σ′〈L : B → {Lˆ, LF }; ζi−1〉〈Lˆ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
17: if Ci−1 = L : B → {LT , lG}; then
18: σ′ ← σ′〈L : B → {LT , Lˆ}; ζi−1〉〈Lˆ : X := El → lG, ζi−1〉
19: for all k ∈ [i, j) do
20: Let σk = 〈Ck, 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
21: σk ← 〈Ck, 〈ρk[X ←[ e], ιk〉〉
22: if lab(σk) 6= l then
23: if Ck = L : A→ l then
24: σk ← 〈L : A→ l′; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
25: if Ck = L : B → {l, LF }; then
26: σk ← 〈L : B → {l′, LF }; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
27: if Ck = L : B → {LT , l}; then
28: σk ← 〈L : B → {LT , l′}; , 〈ρk, ιk〉〉
29: σ′ ← σ′σk
30: w ← j
31: Let 〈i, j〉 the last element of iters
32: σ′ ← σ′σj . . . σ|σ|−1
33: σ ← σ′
34: i← 0
35: for j = 0 to |σ| − 1 do
36: if lab(σj) /∈ I then
37: σ′i ← σj
38: i← i+ 1
Output σ′
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